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I. Introduction
Imagine you work for a big company that has operations in
many foreign countries and stock traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. While reviewing expense reports as part of your job, you
notice that company employees in Nigeria are submitting
reimbursement requests for large amounts of cash that they
identify as “miscellaneous.” You email several of those employees,
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who all explain that the funds are needed to pay regulatory
approval and contract award “facilitators” who use their
government connections on behalf of the company. The employees
in Nigeria also explain that they have been told by the U.S. home
office to record the payments as “miscellaneous.”
You raise the question of the reimbursements with your
supervisor, who shrugs off your concerns, saying, “We have to
grease a few government palms over there. Everybody does it. Just
process it as ‘miscellaneous’ so the bean counters don’t come after
us.” The payments prey on your conscience, and so you call the
company’s compliance department and leave a message with the
administrative assistant, outlining your concerns and providing
your contact information. Weeks pass, and no one ever calls you
back from the compliance department. You email the company’s
compliance officer about your concerns, but again receive no
response. The requests for reimbursement of the large
“miscellaneous” cash expenses continue to come across your desk
and they are approved without questions. After a few more weeks,
you hear that the company’s division in Nigeria has just begun a
new, very profitable, venture. By then, you are convinced that
employees in the company’s Nigerian division bribed government
officials to get the new venture off the ground.
You know that bribery of foreign officials, as well as
misleading accounting of those payments, can violate U.S. law.
What should you do? Try to go above your supervisor’s head? Call
the compliance department again? Tell the government or someone
else outside the company? Nothing?
Would it change your decision if you might be paid for
reporting the bribery to the government? Not just a token
payment, but hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars
depending on the circumstances? Would the possibility of the
bounty change whether, or how, you blow the whistle?
In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 into law.
The statute, known as “Dodd–Frank” after its prominent sponsors,
former Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and former
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd–
Frank”].
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Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.), imposes detailed
regulation on the financial services industries.2 Over 2,300 pages
long, Dodd–Frank includes numerous provisions to help prevent
and expose fraud and corruption, including measures to encourage
employees and others to report violations of U.S. securities laws,
i.e., whistleblowing.3 Accordingly, Dodd–Frank encourages the
reporting of violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),4 which prohibits giving or offering to give anything of
value to a foreign official in order to influence his or her actions,
and which requires public companies to keep accurate books and
records.
Dodd–Frank both increased protections for whistleblowers
from retaliation by their employers, and created an incentive
system through which whistleblowers may receive between 10%
and 30% of the amounts recovered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) based on the whistleblower’s tip.5 Pursuant to
Dodd–Frank, the SEC established an “Office of the Whistleblower”
to administer the tip system.6
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions were designed to
prevent retaliation against whistleblowers by their employers.7

2. See id. (describing the bill’s objective of regulating the financial
industry).
3. Id.
4. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012) (prohibiting securities issuers,
domestic corporations and individuals, and any other person within United States
territory from corruptly bribing foreign government officials).
5. See id. § 78u-6 (adding Section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protection” to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
6. See id. § 78u-7(d) (directing the SEC to establish a separate office to
administer the whistleblower program); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 165.1–165.20 (2018)
(establishing a similar system for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
7. See JILL L. ROSENBERG & RENEE B. PHILLIPS, WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS
UNDER THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 1, 2 https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Labor_and_Employment/
Labor_PDFs/LaborMeetingsAssets/Whistleblower_Claims_Under_Dodd_Frank.ht
ml (discussing the objective of the whistleblower provisions).
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The new rules provide additional remedies8 for employees who
suffer for reporting violations of the law to the SEC.9
Although anti-retaliation measures may keep people from
being intimidated into silence, legal protections from retribution
may not suffice to motivate people to become whistleblowers.
Simply protecting whistleblowers from, or compensating them for,
the harms they suffer in the workplace may not be enough to
encourage whistleblowing.10 Sometimes material incentives may
be necessary. As one money manager who claimed to have been
aware of the Madoff fraud back in the 1990s commented, “[p]eople
on Wall Street are not Mother Teresas. They are not going to the
S.E.C. unless there is something in it for them.”11 And the federal
government has had success with incentives in similar contexts.12
For example, as discussed in Part V.B, the False Claims Act13 pays
whistleblower bounties, and the number of whistleblower reports

8. As discussed below in Part III.A, both federal and state laws, in
particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, also provide important
anti-retaliation protection to whistleblowers. See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
9. In February 2018, the Supreme Court clarified that the protections of the
Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions apply only to whistleblowers who bring
their allegations to the SEC. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767
(2018) (holding that an employee who did not report a possible violation of the
Federal securities laws to the SEC did not qualify as a “whistleblower” for
purposes of the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions).
10. See Norman D. Bishara, Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead
Dworkin, The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 37, 59–60 (2013) (noting
research indicating that organizational characteristics and the relative
significance of the alleged wrongdoing, rather than protection from retaliation,
inform the decision to report); Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the
Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2215, 2226 (2017) (discussing the
intersection between whistleblowing and potential self-incrimination as a
disincentive to report).
11. See Stephen Dugner, Would a Fraud Bounty Have Exposed Madoff Years
Ago?,
FREAKONOMICS
BLOG
(Feb.
26,
2009,
10:30
AM),
http://freakonomics.com/2009/02/26/would-a-fraud-bounty-have-exposed-madoffyears-ago/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (noting the reality of being hesitant to
report without incentives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See infra Part V.B (discussing other federal corporate incentive programs
for whistleblowers).
13. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (as codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2012)); Infra Part V.B.
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under the act increased substantially after a 1986 amendment
made financial awards more likely.14
Despite its superficially obvious logic, however, the impact of
the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system implemented in
201115 is still unclear. Does the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
incentive system increase the quality or quantity of tips received
by the SEC? Do those tips improve enforcement of the FCPA,
thereby decreasing overall levels of corruption?
Lack of data is a problem for answering such questions.
Allegations of FCPA violations account for about 5% of
whistleblower tips under the Dodd–Frank system.16 The SEC
carefully protects the anonymity of whistleblowers who provide
tips and receive awards under the program.17 Although at least one
award payment has been widely reported as resulting from an
FCPA tip,18 it is impossible to confirm the precise circumstances or
recipients of this or other awards.
Moreover, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower bounty program fits
somewhat awkwardly with other FCPA enforcement mechanisms.
Because the program is based on informing the SEC of violations
14. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for
150 Years for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261,
1275–76 (2013) (explaining how the amendments revitalized qui tam cases, with
“smashing recoveries” for whistleblowers). The 1986 amendments significantly
increased the whistleblower’s role, as well as the whistleblower’s share of the
proceeds recovered. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
15. The SEC implemented the whistleblower program by issuing final rules
on May 25, 2011. The final rules became effective as of August 12, 2011. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.21F-1–240.21F-17 (2018).
16. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 31 (2017) [hereinafter SEC,
2017 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting the number of whistleblower tips between fiscal
years 2014 and 2017 by allegation type).
17. See id. at 17–18 (explaining the SEC’s whistleblower protection
practices).
18. See Nick McKenzie, Michael Bachelard & Richard Baker, US Awards $5
Million to BHP Billiton Whistleblower, FIN. REV. (Aug. 28, 2016, 8:43 PM),
http://www.afr.com/news/us-awards-5-million-to-bhp-billiton-whistleblower20160828-gr35vl (last updated Aug. 28, 2016, 7:35 PM) (last visited Apr. 14, 2018)
(citing legal sources confirming that the SEC paid U.S. $3.75 million to an
Australian FCPA whistleblower and contrasting that with the treatment of
whistleblowers under Australian laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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of the securities laws and the SEC’s subsequent enforcement of
those laws, the scope of the incentive program is limited to the
SEC’s jurisdiction.19 Thus, whistleblower incentives are available
for persons identifying FCPA violations resulting in civil actions
against publicly traded companies,20 which is narrower than the
scope of the FCPA. In addition, there has been debate surrounding
whether and how whistleblowers who are company attorneys and
compliance personnel can report to the SEC and apply for awards.
At a deeper level, the program raises questions about the practical
and ethical complexities of rewarding employees for exposing
workplace corruption externally to federal agencies. In short, it is
not entirely clear what constitute “improvements” of FCPA
enforcement, much less whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
incentive program is making such improvements.
This Article will look at the whistleblower incentive program
together with the FCPA. Part II will look at the FCPA itself, and
how it is applied.21 In particular, it will discuss the importance of
whistleblower tips in enforcement of the FCPA. Part III will look
more closely at whistleblower law, including provisions of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,22 Dodd–Frank, and the related SEC
rules and guidance.23 It will focus on several issues that arise in
the intersection of the Dodd–Frank incentive program and the
FCPA. Part IV will discuss moral and ethical aspects of
incentivizing whistleblowing.24 It will consider whether incentives
decrease altruistic behavior, and whether they are appropriate
when the whistleblower’s motivation is suspect. Part V will
examine other examples of U.S. whistleblower award systems, and
19. See Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/frequently-asked-questions (last updated
Aug. 29, 2017) (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (noting the limits of the SEC’s
jurisdiction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d) (2012). For an excellent discussion of the SEC’s
jurisdiction in FCPA anti-bribery matters, see generally Barbara Black, The SEC
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of
the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093 (2012).
21. Infra Part II.
22. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
23. Infra Part III.
24. Infra Part IV.
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compare U.S. approaches to international attitudes.25 Part VI will
conclude by discussing whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
incentives increase the quality or quantity of tips received by the
SEC and, as a result, whether the incentives improve enforcement
of the FCPA.26
II. The FCPA and Whistleblower Tips
A. The FCPA
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA,27 which amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in response to public outrage over
corruption following both the Watergate scandal and the following
reports that hundreds of large companies made substantial
improper or illegal payments overseas.28 The FCPA applies to a
wide variety of actors including: U.S. domestic concerns, such as
natural persons and companies incorporated in the United States;
U.S. or non-U.S. companies with publicly traded securities on U.S.
exchanges (known as issuers); and persons who are in U.S.
territory when they commit a violation of the statute.29
The FCPA has two substantive foci. First, the law prohibits
domestic concerns, issuers, and persons in U.S. territory from
bribing or offering to bribe foreign officials in order to obtain or
retain business.30 Specifically, the FCPA prohibits the use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
corruptly, in furtherance of an offer, payment, gift, or promise to
pay or give money or anything of value, to any foreign official for
purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official
25. Infra Part V.
26. Infra Part VI.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
28. See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L.
REV. 489, 499–501 (2011) [hereinafter Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement]
(discussing the background of the FCPA as well as subsequent amendments to
the Act).
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (establishing the FCPA’s applicability to
each classification).
30. See id. (prohibiting the corrupt bribery of foreign government officials).
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in his official capacity, or inducing such foreign official to do or omit
to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, or securing any
improper advantage, in order to obtain or retain business.31 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) is tasked with all criminal
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions, as well as civil
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against domestic
concerns and persons who violate the FCPA while within U.S.
territory.32 The SEC is in charge of civil enforcement of the
anti-bribery provisions against issuers.33
Second, the FCPA requires issuers to keep accurate books and
records, and to devise and maintain systems of internal accounting
controls that provide reasonable assurances that their
transactions and assets are properly maintained.34 These
“accounting provisions” apply only to issuers, i.e., companies with
securities publicly traded in the U.S.35 The accounting provisions
work in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions to prevent the
kinds of “slush” funds that enable improper foreign payments of
the sort discussed in Part I’s hypothetical.36 The SEC is in charge
of civil enforcement of the accounting provisions against issuers,
and the DOJ handles criminal enforcement of the accounting
provisions against issuers.37

31.
32.

See id. (same).
See U.S. DOJ CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N ENF. DIV., A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012)
[hereinafter FCPA GUIDE] (discussing the FCPA enforcement landscape).
33. See id. (same).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2) (2012) (establishing the internal accounting
requirements).
35. See id. (applying these requirements to “[e]very issuer which has a class
of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of [Title 15] and
every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of [Title
15]”).
36. Infra Part I.
37. See FCPA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 4–5 (noting the different enforcement
responsibilities of the DOJ and SEC).
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B. Tips Are Critical to FCPA Enforcement
1. How Violations Come to Light

Whistleblowers are critical to compliance with and
enforcement of the FCPA.38 In general, the specter of a
whistleblower may encourage legal compliance and deter illegal
activity.39 Whistleblowers who report externally to the SEC also
serve to expose violations that might not otherwise be detected.40
In fact, the threat of whistleblowers reporting externally may
increase the quality of self-reporting by companies themselves.
Companies may endeavor to provide information to regulators
before their employee whistleblowers report to the government,
engaging in a kind of race to report before the window for voluntary
self-disclosure closes.41 Whistleblowers are often credited with
reducing regulatory costs,42 as agencies effectively deputize the
public to investigate company practices.
38. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws:
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
1633, 1635–36 (2008) (arguing that employees are often in a unique position to
detect and report wrongdoing).
39. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of
State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 108 (2000) (showing that most
state legislatures regard whistleblowing as a mechanism for deterring and
uncovering wrongful conduct).
40. See, e.g., Stefan Rutzel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a
Response to the Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 2 (1995) (explaining how employees can provide the
information necessary for management and government to improve compliance
with environmental laws).
41. See Baer, supra note 10, at 2240 (discussing the positive effects of
external reporting). Companies’ incentives to self-report potential FCPA
violations before whistleblowers contact the SEC are likely to increase now that
the Department of Justice has made its program of credit for voluntary
self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation in FCPA matters permanent. See
Press Release, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 34th
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-generalrosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign (last visited
Apr. 14, 2018) (explaining the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to be inserted
into the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
42. See Laura Simoff, Confusion and Deterrence: The Problems that Arise
from a Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for Environmental
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Whistleblowers are particularly important in the FCPA
context. The FCPA prohibits offers or payments of anything of
value to foreign officials to obtain or retain business, and can lead
to substantial civil and criminal sanctions.43 Given the FCPA
prohibitions and potential sanctions, to say nothing of national
anti-bribery laws in the foreign countries themselves, companies
usually keep illicit payments secret.44 Nor is the foreign official
likely to report that he or she has been offered, much less received,
such a payment. In most circumstances, the prohibited payment or
offer is not going to be made in a way that is easily visible to the
general public or to regulators.
Consequently, it is unsurprising that FCPA investigations by
both the DOJ and the SEC are often triggered by information from
employees of a company offering the bribe.45 For example, SEC
charges against Anheuser-Busch InBev, which were settled in
September 2016 for $6 million, arose from misconduct reported by
a company employee to the SEC.46 For another example, in
“Whistleblowers”, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 326 (1999) (noting that
whistleblowing increases compliance without expending additional public funds
for supervision or detection); Shawn Marie Boyne, Financial Incentives and
Truth-Telling: The Growth of Whistle-Blowing Legislation in the United States, in
WHISTLEBLOWING—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 279, 283 (Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit
Forst eds., 2016) (noting that government auditors cannot ferret out all fraud);
Baer, supra note 10, at 2235 (discussing whistleblowing’s deterrent effect on
criminal activity due to the increased likelihood of detection).
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012) (outlining the prohibited foreign
trade practices by issuers, domestic concerns, and other persons).
44. See generally Miriam F. Weismann, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
The Failure of the Self-Regulatory Model of Corporate Governance in the Global
Business Environment, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 615 (2009) (using empirical evidence to
show that the FCPA has not significantly reduced actual instances of corporate
wrongdoing).
45. See Phyllis Diamond, More FCPA Cases in Pipeline, Brockmeyer Says;
Some Administrative, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 851 (Jul. 25,
2014) (detailing the statement of Kara Brockmeyer, former chief of the SEC
Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, that the unit routinely gets “great leads” from
whistleblower complaints and other tips).
46. Press Release, SEC Charges Anheuser-Busch InBev with Violating FCPA
and Whistleblower Protection Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-196.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2018) (noting that the company was also charged with imposing a financial
penalty on the whistleblowing employee with a separation agreement that
included strict non-disclosure terms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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December 2014, Avon reached an understanding with the DOJ and
the SEC for settlement of FCPA charges which included a total of
$135 million in payments as well as other remedial measures.47
The Avon charges stemmed from handling of prohibited payments
in China which were not addressed by the company until the CEO
received a letter from a whistleblower in China.48 In yet another
case, in March 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that the DOJ
and SEC were investigating a whistleblower complaint of possible
FCPA violations by Microsoft Corporation in connection with
business in Italy, Romania and China.49
FCPA whistleblowers may report suspected violations either
by contacting the SEC or the DOJ, or through internal company
processes, which in turn may lead the company to report to
Review).
47. See Litigation Release, SEC Charges Avon Products, Inc. with FCPA
Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23159.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2018) (announcing the settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
48. Id.
49. See Christopher Matthews, U.S. Probes Microsoft, Partners on FCPA
Allegations,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
19,
2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/03/19/u-s-probes-microsoftpartners-on-fcpa-allegations/?mod=WSJBlog (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
(reporting kickback allegations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). There are many other such complaints. For example, Qualcomm
Incorporated disclosed in its quarterly filing with the SEC in February 2012 that
it was under investigation by the SEC and DOJ for FCPA compliance issues
arising from a whistleblower’s allegations made in December 2009 to the audit
committee of the Company’s Board of Directors and to the SEC. See Qualcomm
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 25, 2011) (providing consolidated
financial statements); see also Richard L. Cassin, Qualcomm’s Whistleblower
Woes,
FCPA
BLOG
(Feb.
2,
2012),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/2/qualcomms-whistleblower-woes.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a brief synopsis of the SEC and DOJ
investigation initiated in September 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
In October 2012, the Times of India announced that U.S. spirits company Beam
Inc. was investigating possible FCPA violations in India in response to
whistleblower complaints. See Boby Kurian, Beam Probes India Unit for Fin
Lapses, TIMES INDIA (Oct. 22, 2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
business/india-business/Beam-probes-India-unit-for-fin-lapses/articleshow/16762442
.cms (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (discussing whistleblower allegations of
wrongdoing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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regulators.50 Studies have shown that whistleblowers generally
prefer to report potential violations internally, to their
supervisors.51 As discussed below, outside reporting presents the
employee with a moral conflict.52 In many cases, internal reports
lead to internal investigations that result in resolution of the issue
and/or self-reporting by the company to regulators.53 On the other
hand, lack of a satisfactory internal response may lead to outside
reporting.54
Of course, FCPA investigations may be initiated on grounds
besides an employee whistleblower’s report.55 Competitors of the
company making the prohibited payment may be a source of
information for regulators.56 Alternatively, routine company
50. The question of internal or external reporting by whistleblowers has
been a source of controversy surrounding the Dodd–Frank measures.
51. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 175 (2008)
(“[T]here are empirical findings that most whistle-blowers turn to external
channels only after first reporting internally.”); see also Tim Barney, A
Preliminary Investigation of the Relationship Between Selected Organizational
Characteristics and External Whistleblowing by Employees, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 949,
956 (1992) (detailing the implications of correlations between organization size
and external whistleblowing); Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Who
Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media
Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 170–79 (1994) (positing that internal
whistleblowers are more likely to report to a media outlet after failing to achieve
a constructive resolution). See generally ALBERT U. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY (1970) (theorizing that when members of an organization perceive
adverse conditions within the organization, they will either exit the organization
or voice their grievance).
52. See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 462 (2009) (“From the individual’s
perspective, external whistleblowing inherently encompasses moral conflict.”).
53. See id. (praising organizational models that prioritize reporting
sequences).
54. See id. at 461 (“[E]xternal reporting is incentivized only when the
internal reporting channel fails.”).
55. See CONVERCENT, THE 7 COMMON CAUSES OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT 4–9
(2015), http://www.convercent.com/resource/convercent-white-paper-the-commoncauses-of-fcpa-enforcement.pdf (discussing FCPA enforcement and best
practices).
56. See Mark A. Srere & Kristin Robinson, FCPA Investigations: Competitors
Dropping the Dime, BRYAN CAVE LLP, https://www.bryancave.com/en/thoughtleadership/fcpa-investigations-competitors-dropping-the-dime.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2018) (discussing a case where a company that lost a foreign government
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audits may uncover the prohibited payments.57 Nevertheless,
company insiders remain a key source of information about
potential FCPA violations.58 For example, the ongoing
investigation of possible FCPA violations in Mexico by Wal-Mart
was triggered by disclosures by one of the company’s real estate
executives, first internally through the company channels, and
then, when that did not work, externally, to a reporter from The
New York Times.59
FCPA violations such as bribery and accounting irregularities
are typical types of occupational fraud,60 which in general are
likely to be detected through whistleblower tips.61 According to an
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2016 report, tips are the
most common method for detecting occupational fraud, accounting
for 39.1% of cases.62 The percentages are even higher in cases of

contract bid reported a competitor for violating the FCPA) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See FCPA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 53 (stating that “self-reports [and]
public disclosures by companies” can influence SEC enforcement decisions).
58. See id. (stating that “tips from informants or whistleblowers” are a
primary source of information about corporate wrongdoing).
59. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart
After
Top-Level
Struggle,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
21,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribeinquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (discussing a
failure of disclosure procedures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop Here? Board Responsibility
for FCPA Compliance, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 493, 511 (2017) (outlining the efforts of
Sergio Cicero Zapata to draw Wal-Mart’s attention to the alleged bribery by its
Mexican subsidiary).
60. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2016 REPORT TO THE NATION
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 11 (2016) (depicting a “Fraud Tree” with the
different categories of Corruption, Asset Misappropriation, and Financial
Statement Fraud).
61. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower
Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
721, 756 (2014) (positing that whistleblowing is the most effective way to detect
fraud).
62. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, supra note 60, at 20
(discussing the detection of fraud schemes). This percentage is down slightly from
2014 (42.2%) and 2012 (43.3%). Id. Detection through internal audits and
management review accounted for only 16.5% and 13.4% of cases, respectively.
Id.
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public companies, in which 43.5% of cases of occupational fraud are
uncovered in response to tips.63
So far there has been no official confirmation that a Dodd–
Frank whistleblower award has been paid to a person providing
information on an FCPA violation. When making an award, the
SEC does not disclose the name of the whistleblower or the
company involved in order to protect whistleblower anonymity.64
However, in a majority of FCPA corporate resolutions since the
passage of Dodd–Frank, the government’s recovery has been
sufficiently large that a tip that led to the recovery would have
been eligible for an award under the Dodd–Frank program.65 In
2017, for example, all eleven of the SEC or DOJ corporate
resolutions involved fines of $1,000,000 or more.66 As a result,
notices of all seven of the resolutions in which the SEC (as opposed
to the DOJ) collected penalties were posted by the SEC’s Office of
the Whistleblower website as “covered actions” in connection with
which whistleblowers could apply for awards.67
In addition, the Financial Review (Australia) reported in 2016
that the SEC paid a whistleblower bounty of AUS$5 million
63. See id. at 20, 27 (discussing duration and detection of fraud schemes,
respectively); see also FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES,
DISINCENTIVES, AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 2 (2012) (discussing the importance
of employee tips).
64. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER,
2017
ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
3
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf
(promising to “safeguard whistleblower confidentiality”).
65. See id. at 16–17 (reviewing the history of awards given post-Dodd–
Frank).
66. See Richard Cassin, The 2016 Enforcement Index, FCPA BLOG,
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/1/3/the-2016-fcpa-enforcement-index.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (relaying FCPA enforcement data from 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. Compare Notice of Covered Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/nocas?aId=edit-year&year=All (last visited
Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting a comprehensive list of actions) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Cassin, supra note 66 (providing a
condensed synopsis of the cumulative action data from 2017). As discussed below
in Part III.B.2, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower posts a Notice of Covered
Action for each SEC action in which monetary sanctions have exceeded
$1,000,000 and therefore a whistleblower award claim may be filed. See Notice of
Covered Actions, supra (reporting a comprehensive list of actions).
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(US$3.75 million) for evidence that exposed alleged bribery by the
mining company BHP Billiton in connection with its hospitality
program during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.68 The company had
resolved an FCPA enforcement action in May 2015, paying the
SEC $25 million. The SEC posted a Notice of Covered Action with
respect to the BHP Billiton resolution on June 30, 2015.69 The SEC
announced an award of “more than $3.5 million” to a whistleblower
on May 13, 2016.70 Nevertheless, there is no official confirmation
that the award went to the BHP Billiton employee for an FCPA
tip.
2. Robust FCPA Enforcement
The likelihood of an FCPA tip leading to a Dodd–Frank
whistleblower award is substantial in the current environment of
robust FCPA enforcement, even if the award is impossible to
confirm due to the SEC’s protection of employee anonymity.71 As it
happened, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower protections and
incentives were enacted during an historic surge in FCPA
enforcement.72 With more and more FCPA cases being
investigated,73 inside tips have come to assume correspondingly
greater importance.
68. See McKenzie et al., supra note 18 (providing an Australian perspective
on recent whistleblower awards).
69. See BHP Billiton Ltd. & BHP Billiton Plc, SEC File No. 3-16546 (2015)
(admin. proc.) (levying sanctions and a hefty fine).
70. See Whistleblower Award Proc., SEC File No. 2016-9 (2016) (observing
that the SEC had originally denied the claim).
71. There is a circularity to enforcement of the FCPA in the whistleblower
incentive context. More enforcement leads to more opportunities for
whistleblower awards. More awards lead to more whistleblowers coming forward
with tips. More tips make more enforcement of the FCPA possible.
72. See Kevin LaCroix, Corruption Enforcement Actions Surge, Follow-On
Lawsuits
Emerge,
D&O
DIARY
(Apr.
21,
2010),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2010/04/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/corr
uption-enforcement-actions-surge-follow-on-lawsuits-emerge/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2018) (“[T]he level of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement in the
first quarter of 2010 was ‘unprecedented.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
73. See FCPA 2016 Year in Review, JONES DAY (Jan. 2017),
http://www.jonesday.com/fcpa-2016-year-in-review-01-30-2017/ (last visited on

CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE

1113

It was not always so. During the first three decades that the
FCPA was in force, the SEC and DOJ brought a handful of actions
each year, resolved with moderate fines.74 For example, the DOJ
and SEC75 brought only five actions in 2004.76 Beginning in 2007,
enforcement and monetary penalties increased dramatically 77 and
thirty-eight actions were brought by the SEC and the DOJ.78
Enforcement has remained strong. 2016 had the largest number of
FCPA corporate enforcement actions and total settlement amounts
ever:79 the DOJ brought twenty-one actions and the SEC brought
Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that as of December 31, 2016, there were an estimated
eighty active FCPA investigations by the government, and 100 additional
potential targets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition,
in February 2018, an FCPA tracking service reported that 2017 was the most
active year in history for new FCPA-related investigation, with forty-five new
FCPA-related investigations publicly disclosed for the first time. See
FCPATracker, 2017 Was the Most Active Year in History for New FCPA-Related
Investigations,
FCPATRACKER.COM
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://blog.fcpatracker.com/2018/02/2017-was-the-most-active-year-in-historyfor-new-fcpa-related-investigations/ (listing companies and countries involved in
investigations disclosed in 2017) (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate
Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010) (“FCPA
enforcement was largely non-existent for most its history.”).
75. In some cases, both the SEC and the DOJ initiate actions against the
same person or entity.
76. See Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2004, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actionschronological-list-2004 (last updated June 16, 2015) (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
(listing FCPA actions filed in 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
77. See Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, supra note 28, at 496.
78. See 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 4, 2008),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2007Year-EndFCPAUpdate.asp
x (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a thorough synopsis of FCPA enforcement
in 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. See Mike Koehler, The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year, CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (discussing the “wide spectrum of enforcement actions”). Although
2010 may have had higher enforcement action numbers overall, it was skewed as
a result of the so-called “SHOT Show” arrests of twenty-two individuals (which
were eventually not pursued). See Steve Johnson, Sting Charges Dismissed,
Guilty Pleas Vacated, FBI Informant Sentenced to Prison, TFB (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2012/12/03/show-show-sting-chargesdismissed-guilty-pleas-vacated-fbi-informant-sentenced-to-prison/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a colorful account of the incident) (on file with the
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thirty-two.80 2017 was close behind: the DOJ brought twenty-nine
actions, and the SEC brought ten.81 The 40th anniversary year of
the FCPA featured extensive enforcement of the once “sleepy”
law.82
The fines assessed as part of FCPA settlement agreements
have also increased dramatically.83 In 2016, for the first time,
FCPA corporate fines assessed by the DOJ and the SEC topped $2
billion for the year.84 Calendar year 2016 saw the addition of three
more “top ten” fines to the FCPA record books: Teva
Pharmaceuticals settled for $519 million, Och-Ziff settled for $412
million, and VimpelCom settled for $397.6 million.85 The all-time
record fine of $965 million, however, was paid by Telia Company
AB in 2017,86 edging out the $800 million paid by Siemens AG in
Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2017),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2016-year-end-fcpa-update/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2018) (summarizing FCPA enforcement in 2016) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
81. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 3 (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ (detailing 2017 FCPA
enforcement).
82. See id. at 2 (including statistics illustrating the “meteoric rise” of FCPA
enforcement in the last four decades).
83. Enforcement has not been limited to the biggest companies. The SEC is
expanding its FCPA enforcement efforts beyond high-value targets to small or
mid-sized businesses that previously slipped under the radar. For example, in
2014 the government settled charges against Smith and Wesson Holding
Corporation that related to a number of small and unsuccessful bribes. See R.
Daniel O’Connor, Geoff Atkins & Lauren M. Modelski, Smith and Wesson
Settlement Raises FCPA Concerns for U.S. Businesses, May Establish a New
Claim for an Insufficient Compliance Program, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY
REP. (BNA) 10, 14 (2014) (“Despite the small and unsuccessful nature of the bribes
authorized, the penalties paid by Smith & Wesson still reached almost $2
million.”).
84. See 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 80 (announcing that 2016
was a “precedent-setting year” in which the Department of Justice and Securities
and Exchange Commission issued “53 combined enforcement actions” and levied
“more than $2 billion in corporate fines”).
85. Id.
86. See Press Release, Telecommunications Company Paying $965 for FCPA
Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-171 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018)
(reporting that Swedish company Telia would pay a $965 million global
settlement with the SEC, DOJ, and Dutch and Swedish law enforcement to
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2008.87 Also in 2017, Keppel Offshore & Marine joined the top ten
list when it agreed to pay $422 million in fines.88
This surge in enforcement has come along with some
reorganization at the SEC and the DOJ, which both have
earmarked personnel for FCPA investigations.89 The staffing
increase has in turn increased both agencies’ ability to respond to
tips and other reports of potential FCPA violations.90 It seems
reasonable to assume that the capacity and impetus to respond to
whistleblower information has increased accordingly.
3. Whistleblowers Are Important to FCPA Collateral
Shareholder Suits
The “surge in government enforcement of the FCPA has also
increased opportunities for private plaintiffs to bring collateral
civil actions.”91 Shareholders routinely file derivative suits or
securities fraud class actions in the wake of an FCPA
resolve FCPA claims relating to payments in Uzbekistan) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See Richard Cassin, Keppel Offshore Lands Seventh on Our Top Ten
List,
FCPA
BLOG,
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/12/26/keppeloffshore-lands-seventh-on-our-top-ten-list.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018)
(providing a revised top ten list of the largest FCPA penalties) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. See Press Release, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. and U.S. Based
Subsidiary Agree to Pay $422 Million in Global Penalties to Resolve Foreign
Bribery Case, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/keppel-offshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-422-millionglobal-penalties (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting that Keppel entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and would pay the penalty to
resolve charges with U.S., Brazilian, and Singaporean authorities relating to
Brazilian bribery offenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See generally Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, supra note 28
(discussing the agencies’ resources and reorganization).
90. See id. at 559 (“The growth in the number of federal personnel tasked
with FCPA enforcement has made increased enforcement not only possible, but
almost required, by the agencies involved.”); 2017 Year-End FCPA Update,
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 81, at 5 (cataloguing the credentials of the “dozens of
dedicated and talented” lawyers enforcing the FCPA at the DOJ and the SEC).
91. Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217,
1218 (2012).
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investigation, often alleging failure of oversight by the board of
directors92 or misleading disclosure.93 State and federal pleading
requirements, however, make an internal whistleblower nearly a
necessity in these suits as well.
A successful state shareholder derivative suit often requires
insider information because of obstacles to suit posed by technical
pleading requirements. To survive a motion to dismiss,
shareholders filing a derivative suit must either make a pre-suit
demand on the board of directors, i.e., request that the board sue
to enforce the company’s rights, or plead with particularity facts
showing that a pre-suit demand would have been futile and the
lack of a pre-suit demand should be excused.94 Such a showing is
exceedingly difficult. For example, in June 2017 the Delaware
Chancery Court dismissed shareholders’ claims that the
Qualcomm board disregarded red flags regarding FCPA
compliance lapses in China and Korea.95 Among the deficiencies
the court identified in the complaint was the fact that the plaintiffs
failed to allege the “particularized facts” necessary to show pre-suit
demand futility.96
Similarly, the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 199597 imposes additional pleading requirements on securities
92. These are known as “Caremark Claims” after a seminal director
oversight/fiduciary duty case decided by the Delaware Chancery Court in 1996.
See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996) (approving settlement of a derivative action because shareholders were
unlikely to show that the directors violated their fiduciary duty).
93. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring plaintiffs to “state with
particularity (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the
directors or comparable authority . . . and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the
action or not making the effort”). State rules of civil procedure provide the same
procedural requirement. See generally Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del.
1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984); In re Citigroup Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).
95. See In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA Stockholder Derivative Litig., C.A. No.
11152–VCMR, 2017 WL 2608723, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2017) (granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand or adequately allege
demand futility).
96. See id. at *3 (discussing the proper response to “red flags” which indicate
an FCPA violation).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in various sections
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law class action lawsuits, requiring plaintiffs to plead claims that
defendants made false statements with particularity and to create
a “strong inference” of scienter in those pleadings.98 Failure to
meet the pleading requirements results in dismissal of the claim.99
In short, specific information is a requirement of a successful
shareholder suit, whether the claim is under state or federal law.
Once a civil suit has commenced, the parties have rights to
information held by the other side: such information is obtained
through the discovery process. Pleading, however, begins a case,
and therefore takes place before the parties have rights to
discovery. As a result, requirements that a plaintiff “plead with
particularity”100 are difficult to satisfy without inside information.
Consequently, in practice, whistleblowers are key not only to
FCPA investigations, but also to collateral suits filed in the wake
of such investigations.
III. The Whistleblower Incentive Program
A. Whistleblower Law
1. Background
The United States has encouraged whistleblowing since its
inception. On July 30, 1778 the Continental Congress
unanimously enacted the first whistleblower legislation, which
read:
Resolved, That it is the duty of all persons in the service of the
United States, as well as all other inhabitants thereof, to give
the earliest information to Congress or any other proper
authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors

of 15 U.S.C.). In addition, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–59 (2007), imposed heightened
pleading standards.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (setting forth the particularity and
scienter pleading requirements).
99. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3) (mandating dismissal for non-compliant pleadings).
100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring particularity when pleading fraud or
mistake).
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committed by any officers or persons in the service of these
states, which may come to their knowledge.101

U.S. whistleblower law, however, has been fairly described as more
of a patchwork than a coherent legal regime.102 Some current laws
date back over a century. For example, the False Claims Act
(FCA)103 was first passed in 1863 to provide protection and
incentives to persons who report fraud against the government.104
Strengthened in 1986, the FCA includes both substantial
anti-retaliation protections for the persons who report fraud and
qui tam provisions that permit private parties to file suit in place
of the government.105 Because its qui tam provisions permit the
recovery of a bounty, the FCA will be discussed in more detail
below in Part V.B.
The majority of whistleblower provisions focus on protecting
employees from various forms of employer retaliation, most
notably discharge.106 Such anti-retaliation protection is important:
reporting legal violations risks the whistleblower’s job and career.
Some studies show that a majority of employee whistleblowers are
demoted or fired for blowing the whistle.107
101. Legislation of July 30, 1778, reprinted in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds.) (Washington, D.C., 1904–
37) 11:732.
102. See Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing
Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form
a Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2011) (advocating for
the retention of a myriad of different protections); Boyne, supra note 42, at 279,
280 (calling U.S. whistleblower protections “an inconsistent legislative
patchwork”).
103. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
104. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended
in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733); see also Jeanne A. Markey & Gary L. Azorsky,
Companies and Counsel Beware: Companies Cannot Override Employees’ Right
to Act as Whistle-Blowers Under False Claims Act, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY
REP. (BNA) 786, 786 (2014) [hereinafter Markey & Azorsky] (discussing the
history of whistleblowing).
105. See 31 U.S.C §§ 3730–3732 (2012) (outlining, among other things, the
rights of parties to qui tam actions).
106. See generally Sinzdak, supra note 38 (providing a comparative analysis
of current whistleblower laws).
107. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? An Attempt to
Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act,
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 113 (noting that most whistleblowers are fired).

CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE

1119

Whistleblower anti-retaliation protections have thus
developed as exceptions to employment “at will” since the 1930s,
with an increase in laws protecting employees against discharge
appearing since the 1960s.108 Over thirty federal whistleblower
statutes have been passed in the last several decades.109 In 1978,
the United States passed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,110
the first federal statutory cause of action protecting whistleblowers
from retaliation.111 The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,112
enacted in 1989, strengthened protection for federal employees by
preventing unlawful retaliation and outlawing adverse
employment actions against employees who report prohibited
practices to the proper authorities.113 There are also more specific
laws protecting whistleblowers who report particular types of
violations, such as discrimination,114 environmental issues,115 and
conduct adverse to health, safety and welfare.

108. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 441 (discussing the National Labor Relations
Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Civil Service
Reform Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988).
109. See Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR.
(2017),
https://www.whistle
blowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=816&Itemid=129
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a comprehensive list of whistleblower laws)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, there is often a
public policy exception to state employment-at-will doctrine which provides a
remedy for discharging an employee for reporting a violation of law. Such a claim
might be either a tort or contract violation, with higher damages possible in tort
jurisdictions.
110. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
111. S. REP. No. 100-413, at 2 (1988).
112. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in sections of 5 U.S.C.).
113. See Hesch, supra note 102, at 63 (referring to the Whistleblower
Protection Act as a “ground-breaking law”).
114. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991), the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009), the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (2016), protect employees (and applicants for employment) from
retaliation for reporting discrimination.
115. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (protecting whistleblowers under the
Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (protecting whistleblowers under the Clean
Water Act).
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The protections and incentives for whistleblowers who report
securities laws violations have been the focus of legislation since
2000, with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002116 and Dodd–
Frank in 2010.117
2. Securities Law and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
The whistleblower landscape was significantly altered in 2002
with the passage of SOX. Enacted after the Enron and WorldCom
scandals in order to protect shareholders and the public against
fraudulent financial reporting and accounting practices, SOX
increased reporting obligations for issuers,118 thereby increasing
the amount of information required and available for inspection.
SOX resulted in revamped and reenergized compliance programs
at many issuers. In an effort to encourage and increase internal
reporting of violations of U.S. securities laws, SOX § 806 also
added substantial protections for whistleblowers, including both
federal employees and, for the first time, employees of publicly
traded companies.119 In fact, in an apparent reference to the efforts
of Sherron Watkins at Enron, the Senate report that was produced
in connection with SOX stated that “in a variety of instances when
corporate employees at Enron and [Arthur] Andersen attempted to
report or ‘blow the whistle’ on fraud . . . they were discouraged at
nearly every turn.”120
SOX protects employees who provide information or assist in
an investigation regarding any conduct that the employee
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of several laws
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
117. 12 U.S.C. § 5511.
118. So much so, in fact, that implementation of several of the audit
provisions had to be postponed, and some foreign private issuers delisted from
U.S. exchanges to avoid what they saw as expensive and burdensome regulation.
SOX also imposes an obligation on attorneys to report “up the ladder,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 7245, or in some cases to a qualified legal compliance committee, 17 C.F.R. §§
205.2(k), 205(c) (2018).
119. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat.
745 (outlining the “whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded
companies”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
120. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002).
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prohibiting fraud, or of any rule or regulation of the SEC.121 The
SOX anti-retaliation provisions were included to prevent
employers from discouraging employees with knowledge of
improper financial reporting and accounting practices from
reporting.122
B. Dodd–Frank
1. Dodd–Frank Section 922
Less than a decade after the passage of SOX, and despite the
reporting and assessment mechanisms it imposed on public
companies, Congress again found itself grappling with corporate
improprieties. Dodd–Frank was passed following the Global
Financial Crisis and the discovery in 2008 of Bernard Madoff’s
multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme, along with information that
financial analyst and certified fraud examiner Harry Markopolos
had been attempting to report Madoff’s fraud to the SEC for many
years.123 With Dodd–Frank, Congress again sought to curb
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). This includes “frauds and swindles,” id. § 1341,
“fraud by wire, radio, or television,” id. § 1343, “bank fraud,” id. § 1344, “securities
and commodities fraud,” id. § 1348, and any provision of federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders. Id. § 1514A(a)(1). SOX prevents an employer from
discharging or retaliating against an employee for engaging in a protected
activity. The SOX whistleblower protections only apply when the information is
provided to, or investigation conducted by, a federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency, a member of Congress or a committee of Congress, or a
person with supervisory authority over the employee. Id. There is also protection
for testifying. Id. § 1514A(a)(2).
122. See DAVISPOLK, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/06.09.14.Recent.Developments.in_.Whistleblowe
r.Protections.pdf (discussing SOX). Like most other whistleblower protection
laws, SOX requires whistleblower anti-retaliation claims to be filed with the
Department of Labor (DOL). Id. SOX, however, added a mechanism to file a
complaint in federal district court if the DOL process does not reach a final
resolution of the complaint within 180 days. Sarbanes–Oxley § 806(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(1)(B). Nevertheless, the process may take years.
123. See HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL
THRILLER 1 (2010). In his testimony before Congress, Markopolos revealed that
he had attempted to tell the SEC about the Madoff investment fraud in 2000,
2001, and 2005. He also sent information about the fraud to the Wall Street
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fraudulent activity at the country’s largest financial companies,
and to implement measures to prohibit and punish corrupt or
irresponsible behavior at the institutions in which U.S. citizens
invest their savings. Protecting and incentivizing whistleblowers
was an integral part of that effort.
Among the tools assembled in the Dodd–Frank statute were
specific new rules regarding the protection and treatment of
persons who report violations of U.S. federal securities laws to
regulatory authorities. Dodd–Frank § 922 added new Section 21F
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection,”124 which in many ways superseded the
SOX whistleblower provision by strengthening its protections and
adding incentives.
Section 922 defines a whistleblower as:
[A]ny individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by
rule or regulation, by the Commission.125

A whistleblower who voluntarily provides original information to
the SEC that leads to the successful enforcement by the SEC of a
federal court or administrative action in which the SEC obtains
monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000126 may receive
an award equal to between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions
collected by the SEC.127 Original information includes information
that is (i) derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of
the whistleblower; (ii) not known to the SEC from any other
source; and (iii) not exclusively derived from an allegation made in
a judicial or administrative hearing, a governmental report,
hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media.128 Dodd–
Frank also required the U.S. Department of the Treasury to

Journal and former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
125. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
126. The SEC rules permit aggregation of multiple SEC cases that arise out
of a common nucleus of operative facts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d) (2018).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
128. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3).
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establish the Securities and Exchange Commission Investor
Protection Fund to be used to pay whistleblower awards.129
As explained by the SEC, the Dodd–Frank bounty system was
created to encourage individuals with knowledge of violations of
the U.S. securities laws to provide that information voluntarily to
the SEC.130 The bounty thus helps to “correct the imbalance
between the potential whistleblower’s ethical desire to report fraud
and the economic disadvantages of doing so, such as legal costs and
loss of employment, by offering financial rewards to offset the
whistleblower’s career risk.”131
Dodd–Frank required “Implementation and Transition
Provisions for Whistleblower Protection,”132 and directed the SEC
to issue final regulations within nine months to flesh out the
statutory provisions. The SEC was also directed to establish a
separate office within the agency to administer and enforce the
provisions of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentives and
protections.133 This office is the Office of the Whistleblower.
2. The 2011 SEC Regulations Implementing the
Incentive Program
The process of drafting the regulations implementing the new
whistleblower incentive provisions took almost a year and involved
an extensive public notice and comment process. The SEC issued
proposed Regulation 21F on November 3, 2010, which defined
critical terms, outlined the procedures for applying for
whistleblower awards, and generally explained the scope of the

129. Id. § 78u-6(g)(1)–(2). The Investor Protection Fund is also used for the
Inspector General of the SEC. The money comes from fines the SEC receives
which are not used to pay restitution to victims, and by investments made by the
fund. Id. § 78u-6(g)(3).
130. See Whistleblower Award Proc., SEC File No. 34-73174 (2014).
131. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower
Program’s Anti-Retaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
721, 727 (2014) (providing an overview of Dodd–Frank).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(2012).
133. Id. § 78u-6.
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whistleblower program.134 In response, the SEC received more
than 240 comment letters and approximately 1,300 form letters.135
By far, the most controversial provisions related to the
relationship between the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program,
including its incentives, and internal compliance programs at
affected companies.136 Dodd–Frank § 922 clearly requires a
whistleblower to report a violation to the SEC in order to qualify
for an incentive award, i.e., a whistleblower who only reports the
violation internally is not eligible for a bounty.137 However, the
statute did not address what role a whistleblower’s internal
reporting would play in the award decision. Many of the letters
addressed the impact of the Dodd–Frank requirements on FCPA
compliance
and
enforcement
directly.
For
example,
representatives of eleven large U.S. companies wrote to argue that,
given the substantial expertise and well developed compliance
programs at many companies, the SEC regulations should
encourage whistleblowers to use internal company reporting
procedures first.138 Some argued that the whistleblower program
would strengthen FCPA enforcement by encouraging individuals

134. See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.. 34-64545, 17
C.F.R. 240.21f-1–240.21f-17 and 17 CFR 249.1–249.2000 (effective date Aug. 12,
2011) (reconciling whistleblower requirements with the administrative structure
of the SEC).
135. The public comments received by the SEC are available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml.
136. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.. 34-64545, 17 C.F.R.
240.21f-1–240.21f-17 and 17 CFR 249.1–249.2000, at “Background and
Summary,” 4. (effective date August 12, 2011). Other hot button issues in the
rulemaking process related to who should be eligible for awards (i.e., should a
culpable individual be able to claim an award?) and the procedures for submitting
information and making a claim for an award. Id.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) (prescribing the payment of awards to
“whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the
Commission”).
138. Letter from Donna Dabney, Vice President, Sec’y & Corp. Governance
Counsel, Alcoa Inc. et al., to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author); see also Letter from Steven A.
Tyrrell, to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, (Dec. 17,
2010) (on file with author).
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to report.139 Others argued the opposite.140 Still others expressed
concern about the need to protect foreign whistleblowers,
especially in the FCPA context.141
The final regulations, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protections,”142 were approved on May 25, 2011 and took effect
on August 12, 2011 (2011 Regulations). The mechanics of the
whistleblowing process are fairly straightforward. The SEC Office
of the Whistleblower set up a website for individuals seeking to
disclose potential violations, complete with a standardized tip form
(Form TCR: Tip, Complaint or Referral) for whistleblowers to fill
out.143 There is also a whistleblower hotline to respond to questions
from the public about the program.144 The website posts the Notice
of Covered Actions taken by the SEC (i.e., SEC enforcement
actions that result in fines of at least $1,000,000, making them
actions with respect to which, if a whistleblower’s tip led to the
successful enforcement, an award may be pursued by that
whistleblower).145 Under the rules, individuals who satisfy the
Dodd–Frank whistleblower requirements have ninety calendar
days after the notice is posted on the SEC website to apply for an
award by submitting a Form WB-AOO to the Office of the
Whistleblower.146 Between the start of the Dodd–Frank program
139. Letter from James S. Lessard-Templin, Customs & Int’l Trade Attorney,
to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2010) (on
file with author).
140. See generally Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on Dodd–Frank
Whistleblower Reform, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123 (2011)
(submitted as a comment to the SEC) (advocating for a progressive approach to
whistleblower reform).
141. Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2011) (on
file with author).
142. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1–240-21F-17 (2017).
143. Office of the Whistleblower: Submit a Tip¸ U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/submit-a-tip (last visited Jan.
25, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See id. (“Phone: (202) 551-4790.”).
145. Office of the Whistleblower: Previous News and Releases, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/pressreleases (last
visited Jan. 25, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. See Notice of Covered Actions, supra note 67 (providing a comprehensive
list of actions).
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and the end of fiscal year 2017, the SEC posted a total of 1,080
Notice of Covered Actions, of which 193 were in 2017.147
With respect to the controversial issue of internal reporting in
the award context, the SEC decided not to require that
whistleblowers also report violations internally to be eligible for an
award.148 The 2011 Regulations simply defined whistleblowers as:
(a) Definition of a whistleblower.
(1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you

provide the Commission with information pursuant to
the [Procedures for submitting original information] of this
chapter, and the information relates to a possible violation of
the Federal securities laws (including any rules or regulations
thereunder) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.
A whistleblower must be an individual. A company or another
entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.149

Instead of requiring internal reporting for award eligibility, the
2011 Regulations incentivized whistleblowers to use their
companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems when
appropriate.150 The rules provide that a whistleblower can receive
an award for reporting original information to a company’s
internal compliance and reporting systems if the company
self-reports to the SEC and that report leads to a successful
enforcement action.151 In fact, the employee is considered a
whistleblower under the Dodd–Frank program as of the date the
employee reports the information internally as long as the
employee provides the same information to the SEC within 120
days.152 In addition, if the whistleblower first reports internally
147. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (reporting 193
notices); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 14 (2016) (reporting 178 notices);
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 12 (2015) (reporting 709 notices since the
program’s inception).
148. See 17 C.F.R. § 21F-2(a) (2017) (“Whistleblower status and retaliation
protection.”).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7).
151. See id. (describing appropriate procedures post-disclosure).
152. Id.
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and then the entity reports to the SEC, “all of the information that
the entity provides to the SEC will be attributed to the
whistleblower.”153 When determining the amount of an award to a
whistleblower, if the whistleblower voluntarily participated in his
or her company’s internal compliance and reporting system, then
the amount of the award may be increased.154 Conversely, a
whistleblower’s interference with internal compliance and
reporting is a factor that may decrease the amount of an award.155
Accordingly, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive
program has paid several awards to whistleblowers identified as
having tried first to report their concerns through internal
channels. In August 2014, the SEC announced an award of
$300,000 to a company employee who performed audit and
compliance functions.156 The employee initially reported the
violations internally, but when the company failed to take action,
the employee reported to the SEC.157 Similarly, in July 2014, the
SEC announced an award of more than $400,000 to a
whistleblower who reported a fraud to the SEC after the company
failed to address the employee’s concerns internally.158

153. Pacella, supra note 131, at 758.
154. See id. (“To incentivize employees to blow the whistle internally and to
use their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems, the SEC has
included as criteria for increasing an award whether a whistleblower voluntarily
participated in an entity’s internal compliance program.”).
155. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg.
34,300, 34,301 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
156. See Press Release, SEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to
Audit and Compliance Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-180 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“Whistleblower Came to SEC After
Reporting Internally and Company Failed to Take Action.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. Id.
158. See Press Release, SEC Announces Award for Whistleblower Who
Reported Fraud to SEC After Company Failed to Address Issue Internally, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 31, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-154 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“The whistleblower did everything
feasible to correct the issue internally. When it became apparent that the
company would not address the issue, the whistleblower came to the SEC in a
final effort to correct the fraud and prevent investors from being harmed.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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3. Internal Reporting and Anti-Retaliation: The 2015 SEC
Interpretive Guidance
The 2011 Regulations addressed which whistleblowers
qualified for the Dodd–Frank incentive awards and
anti-retaliation protections. However, the scope of the
anti-retaliation provisions—in particular, whether they protect
whistleblowers who report internally but not to the SEC—was the
subject of controversy for several years.
Section 922 prohibits an employer from discharging or
retaliating against an employee for:
(i) . . . providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
(ii) . . . initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation

or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or

(iii) . . . making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities Exchange
Act, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.159

The 2011 Regulations set out a definition of whistleblower “for
the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions” of Dodd–Frank as
follows:
(b) [. . .] you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where
applicable, to a possible violation of the provisions [relating to
temporary restraining orders relating to victim or witness
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). Also included among the disclosures
that are protected are those in connection with 18 U.S.C. § 1513, which deals with
criminal punishment for attempts to kill witnesses, informants or victims. See 18
U.S.C. § 1513 (providing the rules regarding “[r]etaliating against a witness,
victim, or an informant”). An individual alleging discharge or discrimination
under the Dodd–Frank provisions may bring an action directly in a U.S. district
court for relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B) (directing that actions be brought
in the “appropriate district court of the United States”). The Dodd–Frank
whistleblower provisions also include a longer statute of limitations for actions
and greater damages than were provided in SOX. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)–(C)
(detailing the rules for the statute of limitations and damages awards).

CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE

1129

harassment]) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [the
general provisions relating to the protection of whistleblowers
against retaliation set out in Section 922 of Dodd–Frank].
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify
for an award.160

Different courts interpreted the breadth of the anti-retaliation
provisions differently. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.161 that
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions apply only to employees
reporting information to the SEC, and do not extend to an
employee who reported an FCPA violation only through internal
channels.162 The SEC took the opposite position, arguing in amicus
curiae briefs in private retaliation lawsuits that individuals are
entitled to protection from employment retaliation if they report
information about a possible securities violation internally at a
publicly traded company, regardless of whether they separately
report the information to the SEC.163
Confronted with the issue in 2014 in Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens
164
AG, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sidestepped
the internal reporting issue and instead affirmed a trial court’s
dismissal of a claim of retaliation for reporting an FCPA violation

160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2017).
161. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
162. See id. at 623 (holding that “the plain language of the Dodd–Frank
whistleblower-protection provision creates a private cause of action only for
individuals who provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws
to the SEC”).
163. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 22 (referring to the
amicus curiae brief filed by the U.S. Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the DOJ
and the SEC, which urged “the Supreme Court to recognize that Dodd–Frank’s
statutory language, its legislative history, and the Commission’s rules require
that individuals who internally report potential securities violations at a
publicly-traded company are entitled to employment retaliation protection,
regardless of whether they have separately reported that information to the
Commission”).
164. 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014).
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on extraterritoriality grounds.165 The next year, in Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC,166 the Second Circuit again confronted the
definitional issue, this time finding that the anti-retaliation
provisions did protect an employee who, as required by his job,
reported internally first.167 The employee in Berman only reported
to the SEC after he was fired from his job.168
That same year, the SEC issued an “Interpretation of the
SEC’s Whistleblower Rules under Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934” (2015 Interpretive Guidance) in order to
settle the ambiguity.169 The 2015 Interpretive Guidance stated
that an individual’s status as a whistleblower for purposes of
protection under the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions does
not require submission of the information to the SEC; instead,
internal reporting is sufficient.170
Nonetheless, as discussed above, a circuit split developed. On
the one hand, there was the argument that in order to qualify as a
whistleblower for any Dodd–Frank purposes, including both
incentive awards and anti-retaliation protection, an employee
must report to the SEC.171 On the other hand, there was the
argument, espoused by the SEC, that that definition including the
SEC reporting requirement applies only to the incentive award
program.172 In the anti-retaliation context, employees may also
165. See id. at 178 (deciding to “affirm on the ground that Liu seeks an
extraterritorial application of the antiretaliation provision, and that that
provision does not apply extraterritorially”).
166. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
167. See id. at 151 (interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions).
168. See id. at 149 (noting that the employee did not report to the SEC until
after he was fired, and then sought an anti-retaliation remedy under Dodd–
Frank).
169. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules under Section 21F
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 80 Fed. Reg. 47,829 (Aug. 10, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241).
170. See id. /(interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions). The SEC explained
that anti-retaliation protection does not “depend on adherence to the reporting
procedures specified in Exchange Act Rule 21F-9(a) [Procedures for submitting
original information to the SEC], but is determined solely by the terms of
Exchange Act Rule 21F-2(b)(1) [Prohibition against Retaliation].” Id.
171. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (giving the Fifth
Circuit’s view).
172. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text (encapsulating the view

CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE

1131

qualify as whistleblowers if they “mak[e] disclosures that are
required or protected under”173 SOX—and SOX explicitly protects
internal as well as external reporters.174
In June 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari in Digital Realty Trust Inc. v. Somers.175 In that case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had sided with the
Second Circuit, affirming the lower court’s decision that the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions extend to all
persons who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless
of whether they disclose only internally or to the SEC.176 The
Supreme Court issued its decision on February 21, 2018, reversing
the Ninth Circuit decision and, at the same time, abrogating
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC. The Supreme Court opted for the
narrower approach: the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions,
like its bounty provisions, require whistleblowers to report
externally, to the SEC, in order to benefit from the statute’s
protections.177
C. Issues Related to Dodd–Frank Whistleblowers in the FCPA
Context
Although the circuit split regarding the definition of
whistleblowers has been resolved, there remain several open

of the Second Circuit and the SEC).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
174. See Sinzdak, supra note 38, at 1633 n.5 (“SOX protects both employees
who report internally to supervisors and externally to government regulators.”).
175. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 137 S. Ct. 2300 (2017). Despite the
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, lower courts continued to make decisions on
one side of the split or the other. See, e.g., Smith v. Raytheon Co.,
No. 1:17-CV-00438, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2017) (siding with the Fifth
Circuit by adopting a narrow definition of a whistleblower).
176. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (9th Cir.
2017) (concluding that Somers was a whistleblower under Dodd–Frank, although
he made his reports to the company’s senior management and not to the SEC).
177. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (holding that
whistleblowers must report to the SEC in order to fall within the Dodd–Frank
definition of whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation protections as well
as the incentive program).
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issues of interpretation with respect to the application of the
Dodd–Frank whistleblower provisions in the FCPA context.
1. Domestic Concerns or Just Issuers?
In a 2012 case, the U.S. District Court in the Middle District
of Tennessee addressed the ramifications of the shared FCPA
jurisdiction of the DOJ and SEC,178 albeit in the context of the
Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions.179 In Nollner v. Southern
Baptist Convention, Inc.,180 the court found that because the
employee reported alleged violations of the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions by a domestic concern, not by an issuer, the employee
did not qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of Dodd–Frank’s
anti-retaliation provisions.181 As discussed above in Part III.B, the
anti-retaliation provisions protect whistleblowers who provide
information to the SEC; who assist in an investigation or action of
the SEC related to such information; or who make disclosures that
are required or protected under SOX, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, or any other law, rule or regulation subject to the SEC’s
jurisdiction.182
The issue in Nollner thus centered on whether the disclosure
was “required or protected” by laws within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.183 The court explained that, while the SEC exercises
jurisdiction over civil enforcement of FCPA anti-bribery provisions
violations by issuers, Nollner’s case involved an alleged violation
178. For an excellent analysis of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement
jurisdiction, see Black, supra note 20, at 1095 (arguing that FCPA enforcement
does not fit within the SEC’s mission).
179. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn.
2015).
180. 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
181. See id. at 997 (finding that “because the defendants are not ‘issuers’ for
purposes of the FCPA, they are not ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the SEC with
respect to FCPA violations”).
182. See supra Part III.B (explaining the applicable protections for
whistleblowers).
183. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (asserting that “a plaintiff seeking
protection . . . must at least show . . . the disclosure was ‘required or protected’ by
that law, rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction”).
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of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions by a non-issuer domestic
concern, an area under the enforcement authority of the DOJ.184
Because of that distinction, as a non-issuer, Nollner’s employer
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and Nollner did not
qualify for Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation protection.185
Although not a case that dealt with an incentive award,
Nollner is a Dodd–Frank whistleblower case.186 In Nollner, the
court strictly distinguished between the application of the FCPA
to issuers and the application of the FCPA to domestic concerns in
the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing context.187 If a question arises
about whether courts will apply the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
provisions to all FCPA violations, as opposed to just those by
issuers, Nollner seems to indicate that they will not.188
2. Audit and Compliance Personnel and Attorneys
Another issue that has arisen in the Dodd–Frank
whistleblower context is whether employees who perform audit,
compliance or legal functions for a company can be eligible for
incentive awards. With respect to compliance professionals, the
answer appears to be “yes.”189 In August 2014, the SEC awarded
184. See id. at 996 (“Here, because the defendants are not issuers, only the
DOJ—not the SEC—has jurisdiction over them with respect to FCPA
violations.”).
185. See id. at 997 (“Thus, even assuming the allegations to be true, the
Nollners may not maintain DFA [Dodd–Frank Act] retaliation claims premised
on their reporting of potential FCPA violations by the defendants.”).
186. See id. at 992–98 (detailing the “Dodd–Frank Act Claim”).
187. See id. at 996 (“Thus, the jurisdiction of the SEC with respect to the
FCPA violations is limited only to civil actions to enforce violations by issuers, but
does not encompass FCPA violations by domestic concerns, which are subject to
exclusive DOJ enforcement (civil and/or criminal).”).
188. See id. at 1002 (dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs’ Dodd–Frank
claims).
189. Note, however, that the answer appears to be different in the
anti-retaliation context. In Reyher v. Grant Thornton, LLP, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed an anti-retaliation suit
by a certified public accountant who allegedly was fired for reporting accounting
irregularities in certain clients’ tax documents. No. 16–1757, 2017 WL 2880585,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). The court dismissed the suit, reasoning that, because
the whistleblower worked for a private company and failed to allege that public
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$300,000 to an audit and compliance employee who reported to the
SEC after the company did not act on the information the employee
provided.190 Sean McKessy, then-Chief of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower, said that “[i]ndividuals who perform internal
audit, compliance, and legal functions for companies are on the
front lines in the battle against fraud and corruption. They often
are privy to the very kinds of specific, timely, and credible
information that can prevent an imminent fraud or stop an
ongoing one.”191 As a result, they may be eligible for awards, “if
their companies fail to take appropriate, timely action on
information they first reported internally.”192
In April 2015, the SEC announced the award of between $1.4–
$1.6 million to a whistleblowing compliance employee who
provided information for an enforcement action against the
employee’s company.193 In its announcement, the SEC further
clarified the application of the incentive program to compliance
personnel,194 emphasizing that receipt of a whistleblower award
requires the submission of information that derives from the
whistleblower’s “independent knowledge or independent
analysis.”195 This provision seems to restrict the eligibility of audit
and compliance personnel. As the SEC explains, unless an
exception applies, “[t]he Commission will not consider information
companies were among the clients with the problematic accounting, no entity
regulated by the SEC was involved. See id. at *7 (“For Reyher, the connection
between Grant Thornton and its public company clients is little more than a
coincidence.”). Thus, the whistleblower was not protected by Dodd–Frank or SOX.
Id.
190. See Press Release, SEC Announces $300,000 Award to Audit and
Compliance Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-180#.VAID3Eh2eos (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (announcing the
whistleblower award) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See In re Claim for Award in Connection with [Redacted] [Redacted],
Exchange Act Release No. 74781 (Apr. 22, 2015) (Whistleblower Award
Proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-74781.pdf (ordering “that
Claimant shall receive [Redacted] of the monetary sanctions collected in this
Covered Action”).
194. See id. at 1 n.1 (applying the provisions of Section 21F).
195. Id.
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to be derived from [a whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or
independent analysis” if the whistleblower “obtained the
information because” the whistleblower was “[a]n employee whose
principal duties involve compliance or internal audit
responsibilities.”196
In the case at hand, however, an exception did apply. The SEC
Claims Review Staff found that the employee “had a reasonable
basis to believe that disclosure of the information to the [SEC]
[was] necessary to prevent the [company] from engaging in conduct
that [was] likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the [company] or investors,” and therefore
qualified for the exception in the rule.197 Andrew Ceresney,
then-Director of the SEC’s enforcement division, noted that the
compliance officer provided the information to the SEC “after
responsible management at the entity became aware of potentially
impending harm to investors and failed to take steps to prevent
it.”198
In addition to audit and compliance personnel, there have
been questions regarding attorney eligibility for whistleblower
bounty awards. The 2011 Regulations provide that—for purposes
of satisfying the Dodd–Frank requirement that a whistleblower
provide independently derived original information—the SEC will
not consider information obtained through a communication that
was subject to the attorney-client privilege, unless disclosure of
that information would otherwise be permitted pursuant to
(1) Section 205.3(d)(2) of the SEC’s Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, (2) applicable state attorney conduct rules,
or (3) “otherwise.”199 Thus, although the default position is that
attorneys are ineligible to receive bounties in connection with

196. Id. (explaining the provisions of Section 21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B)).
197. See id. at 2 n.1 (internal quote omitted).
198. Richard L. Cassin, Compliance Officer Awarded $1.5 Million under SEC
Whistleblower Program, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 22, 2015, 11:28 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/4/22/compliance-officer-awarded-15-millionunder-sec-whistleblowe.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
199. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)–240.21F-4(b)(4)(ii) (2018)
(explaining the requirement).
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information they learn in the course of representing a client,200
there are certain situations in which an attorney may nevertheless
be eligible for an award.
First, an attorney would be eligible if she provided information
to the SEC permitted under Section 205.3(d)(2) of the Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.201 Section 205.3(d)(2), adopted
by the SEC in 2003, provides that:
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer may reveal to the
Commission, without the issuer’s consent, confidential
information related to the representation to the extent the
attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or
administrative proceeding from committing perjury . . . ;
suborning perjury . . . ; or committing any act . . . that is likely
to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the
furtherance of which the attorney’s services were used.202

Section 205 provides “permissive disclosure options” on which an
attorney may rely when reporting confidential client information
to the SEC and seeking a whistleblower incentive award.203
Second, an attorney would be eligible for an award if her action
in informing the SEC were permitted by applicable state attorney
200. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as
Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1045–50 (2015) (setting out the
conflicts of interest that result from allowing attorneys to collect whistleblower
bounties).
201. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (offering the circumstances under which
attorneys are eligible to receive bounties).
202. Id.
203. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections
for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON
REG. 491, 496 (2016) [hereinafter Pacella, Conflicted Counselors] (detailing “the
permissive disclosure options of the Part 205 Rules to report confidential client
information to the SEC for a financial reward”).

CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE

1137

conduct rules.204 Although all state rules prohibit attorneys from
knowingly revealing information relating to the representation of
a client without the consent of the client, virtually all states also
recognize exceptions to this duty based on the state’s interest in
preventing harm to third persons resulting from the client’s illegal
or fraudulent acts.205
The third situation in which an attorney would be eligible for
an award, “otherwise,”206 remains unclear. It was not explained in
the SEC’s Adopting Release for the 2011 Regulations, and has not
been clarified since. At the very least, “otherwise” would seem to
give the SEC discretion to consider privileged information when
circumstances, in the judgment of the SEC, warrant it.
There are some indications that anti-retaliation provisions
that ordinarily protect employees may also act to protect attorney
whistleblowers.207 In February 2017, the former general counsel of
Bio-Rad, Sanford “Sandy” Wadler, was awarded nearly $10
million208 in damages for his firing by the company after he
reported FCPA concerns relating to the company’s operations in
China.209 In that case, the U.S. Magistrate Judge ruled that the
204. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i) (making attorneys eligible for awards
if “disclosure of that information would otherwise be permitted by any attorney
pursuant to . . . the applicable state attorney conduct rules”).
205. See William McLucas et al., Attorneys Caught in the Ethical Crosshairs:
Secretkeepers as Bounty Hunters Under the SEC Whistleblower Rules, 46 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 711, 714 (2014) (explicating that the harm can be “likely to result
from a client’s illegal and/or fraudulent acts”).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i) (2018).
207. For an excellent discussion of retaliation protections for attorney
whistleblowers, see generally Pacella, Conflicted Counselors, supra note 203.
208. There were subsequent reports that, because the back-pay amounts
would be doubled, the original $8 million estimate was low. See Richard L. Cassin,
FCPA Whistleblower: Former Bio-Rad GC Awarded $10 Million for Retaliatory
Firing, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 7, 2017, 7:53 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/
2/7/fcpa-whistleblower-former-bio-rad-gc-awarded-10-million-for.html
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2017) (“[Wadler’s] lawyers at Kerr & Wagstaffe said the back pay
damages will be doubled, resulting in a total award of $10.8 million.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
209. See Final Verdict Form at 3, Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., No.
3:15-CV-02356 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017), ECF No. 223 (showing that the jury
answered affirmatively the question: “Was Mr. Wadler’s engaging in protected
activity under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act a substantial motivating reason for
Bio-Rad’s discharge of Mr. Wadler?”).
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3. Extraterritoriality
A third issue for the SEC whistleblower bounty program of
particular importance in the FCPA context is its application to
foreign whistleblowers. In 2014, the Second Circuit in
Liu-Meng-Lin decided that the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
anti-retaliation provisions did not protect a foreign whistleblower
who reported a potential violation of the FCPA.211
However, the SEC has been clear that the incentive award
system does apply to foreign whistleblowers. In September 2014,
in a release concerning the largest award to that date ($30 million),
the SEC reiterated that the bounty incentive program and the
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd–Frank have different
congressional purposes, aligned with the two whistleblower
descriptions or definitions in the law.212 As the SEC explained:
In our view, there is a sufficient U.S. territorial nexus whenever
a claimant’s information leads to the successful enforcement of
a covered action brought in the United States, concerning
violation of the U.S. securities law, by the Commission, the U.S.
regulatory agency with enforcement authority for such
violations. When these key territorial connections exist, it
makes no difference whether, for example, the claimant was a
foreign national, the claimant resides overseas, the information
210. See Judgment at 1–2, Wadler, No. 3:15-CV-02356, ECF No. 227 (ordering
Wadler’s recovery); see also Melissa Maleske, GCs May Increasingly Blow the
Whistle After Bio-Rad Verdict, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2017, 8:39 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/890360/gcs-may-increasingly-blow-the-whistleafter-bio-rad-verdict (last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (“An $8 million federal jury
verdict award for former Bio-Rad general counsel-turned-whistleblower Sanford
Wadler may loosen the restrictions of GC privilege and embolden more in-house
attorneys to come forward as whistleblowers against their companies, attorneys
say.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
211. See id. at 177 (dismissing the complaint by a plaintiff who was a citizen
and resident of Taiwan).
212. See In re Claim for Award in Connection with [Redacted] [Redacted],
Exchange Act Release No. 74781 (Apr. 22, 2015) (Whistleblower Award
Proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-74781.pdf (ordering the
award).
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was submitted from overseas, or the misconduct comprising the
U.S. securities law violation occurred entirely overseas.213

The SEC further explained that this extraterritorial approach is
consistent with the congressional purpose of motivating persons
with inside knowledge of violations to come forward.214 For
purposes of the incentive award system, determinative factors are
whether the whistleblower voluntarily provides original
information to the SEC that leads to a successful enforcement
action with a fine in excess of $1,000,000,215 not nationality or
location. In fact, with respect to enforcement of the FCPA, the most
likely whistleblowers are located outside the United States.216
SEC efforts to incentivize foreign whistleblowers with the
bounty system have been fairly successful. In fiscal year 2017, the
whistleblower program received tips from individuals in 114
countries outside of the United States,217 and the SEC estimated
that approximately 12% of the individuals participating in the
program were located abroad.218

213. Id. at 2 n.2. The same award release also declined to follow the stricter
territorial approach that the Second Circuit had adopted in Liu v. Siemens. See
id. (allowing the award “notwithstanding the existence of certain aspects of
Claimant’s application”).
214. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010)). Note, however, that
the court in Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens stated that the bounty provision applies
extraterritorially because of regulations promulgated by the SEC, not because of
Congressional intent. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182–83 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–8(c)(2) does not mention the anti-retaliation
provision, and indeed, other SEC regulations suggest that the requirements of
the anti-retaliation and bounty provisions are to be considered separately.”).
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3) (2012) (defining “original information”).
216. See Jeffrey Mathis, Protecting the Brave: Why Congress Should Amend
the Dodd–Frank Act to Better Protect FCPA Whistleblowers, 49 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 829, 838 (2016) (“In recent years, the DOJ and SEC have dramatically
increased FCPA enforcement, especially internationally. Between 2005 and 2010,
more than half of the companies that were involved in FCPA resolutions were
either foreign companies or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies.”).
217. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 26 (depicting a map
reflecting the countries from which whistleblower tips came in fiscal year 2017).
218. See id. at 33 (displaying a chart of whistleblower tips by country in fiscal
year 2017).
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IV. The Morality of Whistleblowing Incentives

Perceptions of corporate whistleblowing vary. In the era of
Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, some see whistleblowers as
heroes, defenders of law, morality, and values more important
than company loyalty.219 Others, however, see them as traitors and
violators of their duty of loyalty to their organizations.220 In
addition, some scholars argue that monetary incentives for
whistleblowing may ultimately decrease reporting of illegal
activity.221
A. The Ethics of Whistleblowing
One way to understand corporate whistleblowing is as a
contest between duty toward the public and duty toward the
employer. In this understanding, whistleblowing is the
individual’s moral obligation to society. Individuals have a public
duty to report lawbreaking, whether it is a street crime or a
violation of the FCPA.222 At the same time, whistleblowing is the
decision to defy one’s superiors and (sometimes) harm one’s

219. See generally Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower
Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information
About Organization Corruption, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107 (1999).
220. See Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the
Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic
Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 642 (2004) (“Whistleblowing employees often are
vilified as ‘snitches,’ ‘informants’ (and most regrettably in the new federal law),
and ‘traitors,’ and consequently may be shunned, ‘blackballed,’ or threatened or
even harmed by fellow employees for not being loyal ‘team-players.’”).
221. See Naseem Faqihi, Note, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An
In-House Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering A Possible Federal
Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3350–51 (2014)
(“Whistleblowers acting in response to a duty to report can be viewed in a better
light than those who act—or are perceived to act—in response to a monetary
reward . . . this perceived motivation is in turn affected by how whistleblowers
are incentivized.”).
222. See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers
Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269,
286 (1996) (arguing for the existence of an underlying “prima facie duty to obey
the law” for all).
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institution.223 All employees are agents of their organization, and
so owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer.224 Employees or
agents thus have a legal duty to act loyally for the benefit of their
employer/principal in all matters connected with that agency.225
Whistleblowing thus involves weighing one’s duty to society
vis-à-vis one’s duty of loyalty to the organization.226 A study
published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology showed that
persons who witnessed unethical behavior and reported it used ten
times as many terms related to “fairness” and “justice.”227
Participants who witnessed unethical behavior and did not report
it used twice as many terms related to “loyalty.”228 The study went
on to demonstrate that emphasizing “fairness” might in some cases
influence people’s decisions regarding reporting violations that
they witness.229 The study suggested that such an emphasis in
corporate mission statements and codes could change employees’
decisionmaking in the whistleblowing context.230

223. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 434 (“[W]histleblowing requires an
individual to defy immediate authorities, even when the information disclosed is
sensitive and its exposure may harm the organization.”).
224. See Leslie L. Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size Does Not Fit
All, 79 MISS. L.J. 853, 854 (2010) (“As agents of the employers, all employees owe
broad fiduciary duties to their employers.”).
225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(recognizing that this fiduciary duty extends to “all matters connected with the
agency relationship”).
226. See Gregory Liyanarachchi & Chris Newdick, The Impact of Moral
Reasoning and Retaliation on Whistle-Blowing: New Zealand Evidence, 89 J. BUS.
ETHICS 37, 40 (2009) (arguing that “employees face an extremely difficult choice
between their loyalty to the organization on the one hand and their moral and
social obligations to do the right thing and potential personal consequences of
blowing the whistle on the other”).
227. Adam Waytz et al., The Whistle-Blower’s Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2013, at SR12. For the study underlying the article, see generally Adam Waytz et
al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma and the Fairness-Loyalty Tradeoff, 49 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1027 (2013).
228. See Adam Waytz et al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma and the
Fairness-Loyalty Tradeoff, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1027, 1027 (2013)
(“[W]e propose that differences in people’s valuation of moral norms, fairness
versus loyalty, contribute to whistleblowing decisions.”).
229. See id. at 1031–32 (indicating the influence of moral norms).
230. See id. at 1032 (discussing the implications of the study).
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Such a schematic understanding of two opposed duties tends
to obscure other considerations. What about an individual’s duty
to herself: the risk of harm to the employee from reporting?231 What
about the family and others who rely on the employee? What about
the possibility that the employer itself, and many fellow
employees, might be harmed by the disclosure? How are such
considerations to be “balanced” against the rather unspecific
societal harm of violation of the securities laws? In the FCPA
context, the societal harms—improper yet often-customary
payments made in another country—may seem particularly
amorphous.
In fact, the difficulty of grappling with such questions may
discourage whistleblowing. A New Zealand study232 showed that
individuals with higher propensities for moral reasoning are more
likely to blow the whistle than are individuals with lower levels of
moral reasoning.233 Actually reporting, as opposed to staying
silent, would thus seem to be correlated with the difficulty of the
decision.
From this perspective, a bounty system simplifies the ethical
calculus. Concerns about dependents and oneself are ameliorated
by cash payment. More deeply, the critique of bounties—that they
reduce the ethical quality of the employee’s decision to blow the
whistle—may be just the point. Whistleblowers, acting in a
corporate context, can truthfully say to themselves that they made
a rationally self-interested decision. Bounties thus raise the
question of whistleblowing for less than purely principled reasons,
with impure hearts and unclean hands, rather than out of a sense
of public duty.

231. See Mathieu Bouville, Whistle-Blowing and Morality, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS
579, 582 (2007) (evaluating the moral complications of reporting).
232. The New Zealand study used accounting students as surrogates for their
professional counterparts. For a discussion of the use of students in empirical
research in the context of corporate disclosures, see Linda Espahbodi, Reza
Espahbodi, Norma Juma & Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Inclusion of
Sustainability Priorities in Corporate Strategy Matter to Investors (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
233. See Liyanarachchi & Newdick, supra note 226, at 44 (demonstrating that
the impact of the level of moral reasoning on participants’ propensity to blow the
whistle increases substantially when they anticipate strong retaliation).
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B. Impure Hearts and Unclean Hands
Understanding whistleblowing as a public duty has its uses,
but also obscures the possibility that whistleblowers may properly
report violations for improper reasons. If whistleblowing is
justified only when a person acts out of public duty, with purity of
heart,234 then whistleblower bounties may be not only
unnecessary, but also wrong.235 On the other hand, doing the right
thing for the public interest, i.e., reporting violations of law for the
wrong reason, is still doing the right thing for the public interest.236
So it is difficult to argue, from a public policy perspective, that
disclosures of FCPA violations are only worthwhile if made for
altruistic reasons. In August 2012, NCR Corporation (NCR)
complained about the motivations of a “purported whistleblower”
who alleged that company sales practices in China, the Middle
East, and Africa might have violated the FCPA.237 Nevertheless,
the SEC undertook a three-year investigation, eventually
declining to recommend an enforcement action.238 Regardless of
234. Douglas Oliver, Whistle-Blowing Engineer, 129 J. PROF. ISSUES IN
ENGINEERING EDUC. & PRAC. 246, 246–56 (2003) (“Whistle-blowing is an activity
that should only be entered into with pure motives.”); see Bouville, supra note
231, at 584 (“There is a tendency to construe whistle-blowing as mandatory and
whistle blowers as heroes, even though these are logically incompatible.”).
235. See Colin Grant, Whistle-Blowers: Saints of Secular Culture, 39 J. BUS.
ETHICS 391, 392 (2002) (arguing that if a person blows the whistle in anticipation
of a reward, the ethical quality of the act is compromised); Bouville, supra note
231, at 584 (claiming that if whistleblowing is a “moral obligation,” then rewards
are incompatible with this responsibility).
236. See Bouville, supra note 231, at 583 (asking “if someone saves my life out
of revenge or greed, should I not say ‘thank you’ rather than ‘this was wrong,
never do it again’?”); Thomas L. Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An
Ethical Analysis of the Federal False Claims Act, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 361 (2008)
(contending that “having good motives is not necessary for being morally justified
in whistle-blowing”).
237. See Chris Matthews & Sam Rubenfeld, NCR Investigates Alleged FCPA
Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2012/08/13/ncr-investigates-alleged-fcpa-violations/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2017) (stating “NCR has certain concerns about the veracity and accuracy of the
allegations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
238. See Richard L. Cassin, NCR: SEC Declination Three Years After
Whistleblower Complaint, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:08 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/8/6/ncr-sec-declination-three-years-after-whistle
blower-complain.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (quoting NCR as saying that it
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the merits of the allegations, why do the employee’s motives
matter?
What if the employee is actually culpable? On June 13, 2017,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Financial Choice
Act, which was intended to rewrite much of Dodd–Frank.239 Among
other things, the proposed overhaul would prevent the SEC from
rewarding “culpable” whistleblowers who took part in the
misconduct they reported.240 In addition to the political hurdles
that the proposed legislation ultimately faced, some attorneys
objected to the change based on the adverse effect on ordinary
Americans and shareholders that would result from fewer
whistleblowers.241
It may be the case that an individual’s desire for profit or
revenge is more likely to promote the public interest in reporting
than an individual’s virtuous desire to support the law.242 However,
had been “informed by the staff of the [SEC] that [the SEC] d[id] not intend to
recommend an enforcement action” (internal quote omitted)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
239. See Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2018) (stating
that part of the purpose of the Act is to “repeal[] the provisions of the Dodd–Frank
Act that make America less prosperous, less stable, and less free”).
240. See id. § 828, Denial of Award to Culpable Whistleblowers (preventing
bounty payments “to any whistleblower who is responsible for, or complicit in, the
violation of the securities laws for which the whistleblower provided information
to the Commission”).
241. See Jasmine Ye Han, Dodd–Frank Overhaul Could Spark Rebound in
SOX
Whistle-Blower
Cases,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(June
5,
2017),
https://www.bna.com/doddfrank-overhaul-spark-n73014451928/ (last visited Dec.
29, 2017) (arguing that “the overhaul envisioned in the Financial Choice Act could
have one unintended consequence: a possible rebound in the number of SOX
whistle-blower claims filed against companies”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
242. See Bouville, supra note 231, at 587 (“As Mandeville . . . pointed out,
greed and other flaws of character may give better results than virtue.”). In 1705,
Bernard Mandeville published the poem, The Fable of the Bees Or Private Vices,
Publick Benefits, with the book. See id. (asserting this proposition). Mandeville
explained the moral as the:
[I]mpossibility of enjoying all the most elegant comforts of life that are
to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful nation, and at
the same time, be blessed with all the virtue and innocence that can be
wished for in a golden age; from thence to expose the unreasonableness
and folly of those, that desirous of being an opulent and flourishing
people and wonderfully greedy after all the benefits they can receive
as such, are yet always murmuring at and exclaiming against those
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should whistleblower incentives be rejected based on an ideal of
the ethical purity of the whistleblower, even though they may
decrease corruption? What is at issue here: institutional corruption
or individual virtue?
Such questions are difficult to address in the abstract; they are
almost always situated in specific contexts. Different approaches
to conflicts between organizational loyalty and legal compliance
may reveal cultural and legal ambivalences about administrative
law, transparency, and individual dissent in group settings.243
Moral analysis of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system
is therefore particularly tricky in the FCPA context, where
reporting often happens in fields contested among various U.S. and
non-U.S. attitudes and interests.
C. The Impact of Whistleblower Incentives: Does Paying for
Altruistic Behavior Reduce It?
Assuming that many whistleblowers report for altruistic
reasons still raises questions regarding the appropriateness of
monetary incentives. Is it right to pay someone to do the right
thing? Some scholars have argued that whistleblower bounties
may have inadvertent counterproductive effects.244 Rather than
triggering internal motivations of potential reporting individuals,
“framing the reporting behavior as a commodity [by paying a
monetary award] may actually crowd out, or suppress, internal
vices and inconveniences that from the beginning of the world to this
present day have been inseparable from all kingdoms and states that
ever were famed for strength, riches, and politeness, at the same time.
Id.
243. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 436 (“By introducing parallel analyses in the
debates in the area of family ties in criminal procedure, civic disobedience and
illegal orders in military settings, and professional roles and legal ethics, the
Article illuminates the pervasive need to connect between substance and
form . . . .”).
244. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for
Reporting Illegal Activity, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2010) (introducing a study
that “offers important practical findings about the costs and benefits of different
regulatory systems, including findings about inadvertent counterproductive
effects of certain legal incentives”).
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moral motivation.”245 The idea of motivational crowding suggests
that external monetary rewards or punishments may undermine
intrinsic motivations driven by an individual’s sense of moral or
civic duty;246 for example, monetary incentives for charitable acts
may decrease principled behavior.247 Studies show that when
children are motivated to perform altruistic acts through an appeal
to their self-interest, if the reward is removed, there is no longer
any desire to continue performing the task.248
Reducing “the right thing” to a cost-benefit analysis, or a
competition, may be appropriate and effective when applied to a
company’s motivation,249 but just the opposite when applied to the
motivations of people who work there. One recent study has shown
that the motivational crowding resulting from financial incentives
for whistleblowers combined with a minimum dollar threshold for
payment of those incentives may inhibit reporting of frauds falling
below the threshold amount.250
245. See id. at 1155 (reporting the results of a series of experimental surveys
of a representative panel of more than 2,000 employees).
246. See id. at 1179 (stressing this theory); EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M.
RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 43
(1985) (distinguishing extrinsic motivation linked to external factors, such as
financial incentives, and intrinsic motivation driven by an individual’s sense of
morality or duty); see also BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 11 (1997) (arguing that “the money offer
crowds-out the citizens’ motivation to do anything for the common good”).
247. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 244, at 1179 (“For example, paying
people in return for their blood might lead donors to view the event as a
transaction rather than a charitable act, thereby eroding altruistic blood
donations.”).
248. See, e.g., Alfie Kohn, The Wrong Way to Get People to Do the Right Thing,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 7, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/thehomework-myth/201505/the-wrong-way-get-people-do-the-right-thing
(last
visited Dec. 29, 2017) (arguing that appealing to self-interest, such as using
rewards, makes people less helpful) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
249. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (Mich. 1919)
(articulating the shareholder wealth maximization doctrine); Theodora Holding
Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (establishing a
reasonableness test for corporate charitable donations).
250. See Leslie Berger et al., Hijacking the Moral Imperative: How Financial
Incentives Can Discourage Whistleblower Reporting, AUDITING: J. PRAC. &
THEORY, Aug. 2017, at 1, 2 (conducting the experiment that explores this
inhibition on whistleblowing).
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V. Corporate Whistleblower Incentives in the United States and
Other Legal Cultures
A. U.S. Enthusiasm for Whistleblower Incentives
As mentioned, the United States has encouraged
whistleblowing since its founding. Whistleblowing is an important
aspect of law enforcement in the United States in securities law
and in a range of other contexts. Concomitantly, the United States
has a long tradition of encouraging and rewarding tipsters.251 As
discussed below, the United States has several “bounty” programs
in the corporate whistleblowing context apart from the incentive
programs established by Dodd–Frank. These include the False
Claims Act, the IRS reporting program, and a now-defunct SEC
Office of the Inspector General program for reports of insider
trading. In addition, a whistleblower award program was
established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the
CFTC) at the same time as the SEC program.
In light of this tradition, the establishment of the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower incentive system is unsurprising.
Congressional debate over Dodd–Frank included assertions that
monetary incentives will increase reporting of illegal activity.
Then-Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) stated that “the guaranteed
massive minimum payments and limited SEC flexibility ensures
that a line of claimants will form at the SEC’s door.”252 Still, the
U.S enthusiasm for whistleblowing incentives is unique.253

251. The idea that the government should pay for the information it requires
to enforce the law also runs deep in U.S. legal culture outside the securities law
context. Consider the common practice of paying informants.
252. 156 CONG. REC. S4076 (daily ed. May 20, 2010).
253. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 279, 280 (“[W]hen the Federal Claims Act
was amended in 1986 to increase the likelihood that a whistleblower would
receive a financial award, the number of FACA reports of false claims for
government funds increased from an average of 6 per year to almost 2 per day in
1999.”).
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B. Other Federal Corporate Whistleblower Incentive Programs
1. The False Claims Act
Qui tam suits under the False Claims Act (FCA)254 are perhaps
the first example of a U.S. federal law offering a monetary
incentive for employees to report illegal behavior externally.255 The
FCA was enacted in 1863 to target Union contractors defrauding
the Lincoln Administration during the Civil War.256 The FCA
enables a whistleblower, as private citizen, to sue a business that
is defrauding the U.S. government and to recover funds on the
government’s behalf.257 The FCA rewards the whistleblower whose
suit recovers government funds and protects her from retaliation,
recognizing the risks she undertakes to stop fraud against the
government.258 Under the False Claims Act Reform Act of 1986, if
found liable under the FCA, a business must pay as much as three
times the government’s losses, plus penalties, for each false
claim.259 The DOJ may intervene in the case, but regardless, if
funds are recovered by the government, the whistleblower qui tam
plaintiff (known as the “relator”) is entitled to 15%–30% of the
recovery, depending on the circumstances.260
254. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
255. See id. § 3730(d) (providing for a 15%–25% whistleblower bounty if the
government intervenes in the action, and a 25%–30% bounty if the whistleblower
litigates the case to completion without the government).
256. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 285 (stating that government fraud is not
only a contemporary phenomenon in response to increased federalization, but also
a historical one that traces back to the Civil War era); Markey & Azorsky, supra
note 104 (identifying the Act’s intent to target private defense contractor fraud
during the Civil War).
257. In addition to the federal False Claims Act, approximately thirty states
have enacted versions of the statute to allow individuals to bring similar lawsuits
in state courts.
258. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (providing the procedures, rights, and protections
granted to relators who bring a civil action under the Act); Boyne, supra note 42,
at 287–88 (describing the incentives and protections of whistleblowers under the
False Claims Act).
259. See id. § 3729(1), (3) (setting the penalties for a person found guilty of
government fraud).
260. See id. § 3730(d) (permitting prevailing relators to recover attorneys’ fees
and reasonable expenses in addition to the bounty).
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Some of the best-known whistleblower bounties have been
paid in the FCA context. In 2009, the DOJ awarded six
whistleblowers bounties totaling over $100 million in connection
with an investigation into Pfizer Inc.’s promotion of certain
pharmaceutical products.261 In 2010, Cheryl Eckhard was awarded
$96 million for reporting information relating to irregularities at
GlaxoSmithKline’s manufacturing facility in Puerto Rico.262 FCA
cases are common. In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. government
recovered over $3.7 billion from civil FCA cases.263 Of the total
recovered in 2017, $3.4 billion was attributed to 669 qui tam
lawsuits.264 The government awarded the whistleblowers a total of
$392 million.265
2. Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower Informant Award
Program
Another well-known U.S. federal whistleblower incentive
program is run by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).266 The IRS
261. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 45–46 (“[Pfizer] had agreed to pay $2.3
billion, the largest healthcare fraud settlement in the history of the Department
of Justice, to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from the illegal promotion
of certain pharmaceutical products.”).
262. See Peter Howe, Whistleblower Wins $96 Million in GlaxoSmithKline
Case, NBCUNIVERSAL (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.necn.com/news/newengland/_NECN__Whistleblower_Wins_96_Million_in_GlaxoSmithKline_Case_
NECN-251401891.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing the
GlaxoSmithKline case, in which the company had to pay a $750 million penalty
for drug manufacturing lapses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
263. See Press Release, Justice Department Recovers $3.7 Billion From False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (detailing the types
and amounts of recoveries from the False Claims Act in 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
264. See id. (“The number of lawsuits filed under the qui tam provisions of the
Act has grown significantly since 1986, with 669 qui tam suits filed this past
year—an average of more than 12 new cases every week.”).
265. See id. (stating that whistleblowers “are often essential to uncovering the
truth”).
266. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2012) (providing awards to whistleblowers who
expose tax underpayments or violations of the Internal Revenue Code).
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offers percentages of recovered taxes to those who report tax
evasion.267 This program, which was put into place over thirty
years ago, requires the IRS to pay whistleblower awards of 15%–
30% of collected proceeds (e.g., tax, penalties, interest and other
amounts) that result from an action in which the Treasury
Department acts based on information provided by the
whistleblower and collects more than $2,000,000.268 In 2006,
Congress established a whistleblower office within the IRS to
administer those awards.269
The IRS has recovered billions of dollars in federal taxes based
on whistleblower tips, and pays out millions of dollars in rewards
each year.270 In August 2014, the Department of the Treasury
issued new regulations271 that expand its whistleblower reward
program, increasing the amount of potential rewards by expanding
the definition of collected proceeds.272 The IRS whistleblower office
made 242 awards in fiscal year 2017 totaling more than $33.9
million.273
267. See id. (providing that whistleblowers will receive between 15%–30% of
the settlement award).
268. See id. § 7623(b)(5)(B) (stating that this awards subsection applies to any
action “if the tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in
dispute exceed $2,000,000”); Whistleblower—Informant Award, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Whistleblower-Informant-Award (last updated Jan. 5,
2018) (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing the information about submitting a
claim and the rules for receiving a reward) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Awards under 15% may be made when the collected proceeds are
below the $2,000,000 threshold. Id.
269. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL
YEAR 2017 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 5 (2017) [hereainfter IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2017]
(“[T]he Whistleblower Office coordinates with other IRS units, analyzes
information submitted, and makes award determinations.”).
270. See id. at 3 (stating that whistleblowers have assisted the IRS in
collecting $3.6 billion in revenue since 2007).
271. 79 Fed. Reg. 47,235 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 301).
272. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012) (stating that a whistleblower receives “as
an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts)
resulting from the action”). Collected proceeds can include taxes, penalties,
interest, and additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided,
as well as the impact of other tax attributes such as net operating losses.
273. See IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra note 269, at 3 (stating that this brings
the total monetary awards paid to whistleblowers since 2007 up to $499 million).
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3. Other U.S. Whistleblower Incentive Programs
In addition, Dodd–Frank created a whistleblower office and
incentive program at the CFTC that mirrors the SEC program. The
CFTC whistleblower program provides monetary awards to people
who provide original information about Commodity Exchange Act
violations that lead to enforcement actions with over $1,000,000 in
sanctions. The CFTC Whistleblower Program was amended in
May 2017 to clarify, among other things, that a claimant is not
required to be the original source of information received by the
CFTC; to add foreign futures authorities to the list of specified
authorities to which a claimant may provide information before
disclosing it to the CFTC without losing original source status; and
to extend the time frames in which a claimant may submit a tip
form.274 To date, the CFTC has made forty-seven final
determinations, resulting in four awards.275
Other corporate whistleblower bounty schemes include the
now-defunct Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988,276 which authorized the SEC to pay bounties of up to
10% to persons who provided information that led to the imposition
of penalties for illegal insider trading penalties.277 That program
274. See CFTC Adopts Amendments to Whistleblower Program, PRAC. L. FIN.
(WESTLAW), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5eda35513fb811e798 dc8b09b
4f043e0/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresul
ts%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad7403600000161330956aaf62a793a%3FNav%3DKNO
WHOW%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI5eda35513fb811e798dc8b09b4f043e0%26sta
rtIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3
DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=09c6d9769ef446006cf0b6c8fb
18b305&list=KNOWHOW&rank=3&sessionScopeId=e30dd092ac2dd48bb9c63b
58a130de76f28a1b755a0650042854fd6558a92f07&originationContext=Search%
20Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29
(last
updated May 24, 2017) (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (listing the amendments for
whistleblower award eligibility) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
275. See Final Orders/Award Determinations, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION, https://www.whistleblower.gov/orders/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2018) (containing the Final Orders of the Commission and related award
determinations regarding complaint applications) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
276. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78, 80 (2012)).
277. Id. § 21A(e).
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was criticized for not being sufficiently generous. Between its
inception in 1989 and 2010, it paid a total of $160,000 based on five
claims.278 Although a payment of $1,000,000 was made in 2010,279
the replacement of the program with the Dodd–Frank program
transformed the SEC’s approach to tips.280 Not only are the
rewards much larger, but the Dodd–Frank program is
better-known,
more
user-friendly,
and
features
easy
communication with and prompt responses from the
government.281
There are a number of other U.S. federal whistleblower
programs, including an act to prevent pollution from ships,282 the
false patent marking statute,283 and parts of the U.S. Tariff Act of
1930,284 as well as an array of state whistleblower false claims
acts.285 There are also several states, including Indiana and Utah,
that have followed the federal government’s lead and established
securities law whistleblower bounty programs.286 A full analysis of
those statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
278. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
ASSESSMENT
OF
THE
SEC’S
BOUNTY
PROGRAM
(2010),
https://www.sec.gov/files/474.pdf (detailing the results of the SEC’s assessment of
the Commission’s bounty program); see also LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 13–14
(stating that the “drafters of Dodd–Frank believed that the SEC had not been
sufficiently generous in the past to whistleblowers”).
279. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 11–12 (stating that the award was for
providing information on alleged illegal insider trading in Microsoft Corp. by a
hedge fund manager and several Microsoft employees).
280. See id. at 12 (stating that Congress was influenced by the SEC’s failure
to uncover the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
281. See Baer, supra note 10, at 2224–25 (“To implement the new program,
the SEC created a new Office of the Whistleblower, which would educate the
public and task a group of SEC agents with reviewing and monitoring tips.”).
282. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2012) (establishing penalties for violating the Act
and rewards for whistleblowers for information leading to conviction).
283. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (establishing penalties for false marking of a patent).
284. See Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C
§ 1619 (2012)) (establishing a reward for a whistleblower that furnishes
information of customs fraud).
285. See State Whistleblower False Claims Laws, PHILLIPS & COHEN,
https://www.phillipsandcohen.com/State-False-Claims-Statutes/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a full survey of U.S. whistleblower programs) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
286. See Gretchen Morgenson, To Crack Down on Securities Fraud, States
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The existence of multiple whistleblower bounty programs does
not prove universal U.S. support, or even acceptance of,
whistleblowing, but it does demonstrate that the Dodd–Frank
whistleblowing programs is not unusual and suggests a general
acceptance of bounties in the United States. It is worth noting that
the Time magazine “Persons of the Year” in 2002 were three
whistleblowers: Cynthia Cooper of Worldcom, Coleen Rowley of the
FBI, and Sherron Watkins of Enron.287 Similarly, on July 7, 2016,
the U.S. Senate designated July 30, 2016 “National Whistleblower
Appreciation Day.”288
C. International Attitudes Towards Corporate Whistleblowing
Incentives
Many other countries take very different approaches to
corporate whistleblowing. Much of the rest of the world lacks
whistleblower incentives, or in many cases even basic
protections.289 Consequently, given that the FCPA prohibits the
Reward Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/22/business/to-crack-down-on-securities-fraud-states-reward-whistleblowers.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“In the aftermath of the financial
crisis, a growing army of confidential informants—better known as whistleblowers—has helped federal securities regulators identify and prosecute
wrongdoers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release,
A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill To Reward And Protect Whistleblowers Who
Report Financial Crimes, N.Y ST. ATT’Y GEN. OFF. (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-andprotect-whistleblowers-who-report-financial (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (stating
that in 2015 that New York was considering such a whistleblower law) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
287. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The
Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1003998,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (detailing the collapse
of Enron and the whistleblowers behind the takedown) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
288. See S. Res. 522, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted) (designating July 30, 2016
as “National Whistleblower Appreciation Day”).
289. See generally Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, Whistleblowing Around the
World: A Comparative Analysis of Whistleblowing in 23 Countries, in
WHISTLEBLOWING—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 29 (Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst
eds., 2016) (pointing out that there is room for improvement even in the most
advanced jurisdictions). Also consider, for example, the suspicious and unsolved
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bribery of foreign officials, an FCPA whistleblower is likely to
confront somewhat conflicting U.S. and foreign attitudes towards
whistleblowing.
Since the turn of the century, there have been some
indications that international norms may be slowly shifting in the
direction of U.S. law with respect to anti-retaliation protections. In
2003, the United Nations opened the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption for signature.290 The convention requires
signatory countries to consider implementing whistleblower
protections to encourage employees to report crimes by their
employers.291 So far, 140 countries have signed.292
In addition, a few other jurisdictions do have whistleblower
incentive programs. In July 2016, the Ontario Securities
Commission adopted a whistleblower program that tracks the
Dodd–Frank program in certain key ways, including the payment
of incentive awards.293 Under the Ontario program, eligible
individuals who voluntarily submit information to the securities
commission regarding a breach of Ontario securities law may
receive a financial award.294 The whistleblower award may be
payable if the information submitted was of meaningful assistance
to the securities commission in investigating the matter and

death of Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky while in police custody.
290. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS
OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ uncac.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (describing the purposes and preventive measures of
United Nations Convention against Corruption and the history of the instrument
in the UN General Assembly) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
291. See Signature and Ratification Status, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS
& CRIME (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
signatories.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (listing the signatories to the UN
Convention against Corruption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
292. Id.
293. See generally OSC POLICY 15-601, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2016),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category1/20160714_15-601_
policy-whistleblower-program.pdf (detailing the purpose and interpretation of the
Ontario Whistleblower Program).
294. See id. at 1 (“Under the Program, individuals who meet certain eligibility
criteria and who voluntarily submit information to Commission Staff regarding a
breach of Ontario securities law may be eligible for a whistleblower award.”).
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obtaining a decision that resulted in a final order for monetary
penalties of CAD$1,000,000 or more.295
In South Korea, incentive awards are generally not allowed,
but may be paid in limited circumstances by the responsible
authorities to whistleblowers to prevent damage to public property
or to help recover public property.296 Also, in 2015 it was reported
that Russia was considering a whistleblower incentive award
system.297 The Ministry of Labor drafted an amendment to the
country’s anti-bribery law which would have entitled a person who
reported a confirmed instance of graft a payment of up to 15% of
the alleged damages to the state budget (capped at approximately
$50,000).298
In some Chinese provinces, the Administration for Industry
and Commerce will pay whistleblowers the equivalent of anywhere
from a few hundred to several thousand dollars for tips regarding
bribery and corruption.299 However, the emergence of
anti-corruption norms enforced by whistleblowing mechanisms
appears to have met with some resistance.300 For example, local
officials in China have been accused of blocking petitioners seeking

295. See id. (detailing the criteria for determining the whistleblower’s
eligibility and the amount of the whistleblower award).
296. See Thüsing & Forst, supra note 42, at 1, 28 (stating that Asian countries
overall are more reluctant to rewarding whistleblowers than European countries
with South Korea being an outlier).
297. See Kristina Furlet, Russia Mulls Whistleblower Reward Law, FCPA
BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/4/16/russiamulls-whistleblower-reward-law.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that
Russia considered amendments to its anti-bribery law to bring the country’s
legislation into compliance with international principles and anticorruption
norms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
298. See id. (listing the general provisions of the proposed law).
299. See Henry Chen, Whistleblowers, East and West, FCPA BLOG (July 23,
2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/23/whistleblowers-eastand-west.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that the reward for
whistleblowers will range from $160 to $4,900 in U.S. currency) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
300. See Hui Zhi, China Whistleblowers Hit Local Obstacles, FCPA BLOG
(April 23, 2014, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/4/23/chinawhistleblowers-hit-local-obstacles.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“A local party
leader said failing to stop the petitioners would be considered a serious dereliction
of duty.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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to report corruption from meeting with inspectors from the Central
Commission for Discipline.301
Although European countries are generally considered less
willing to reward whistleblowers than the United States, in 2014
the Council of Europe adopted a legal instrument on protecting
individuals who report information about acts or omissions in the
workplace that represent a serious threat to the public interest.302
Also in 2014, the European Parliament and Council adopted a
market abuse regulation that allows Member States to provide
financial incentives to persons who offer relevant information
about potential infringements of the law as long as such persons
do not have pre-existing duties to report such information, and the
information is new and results in a successful enforcement
action.303 In addition, in several European Union (EU) countries,
301. See id. (“Persistent petitioners are often held in ‘discipline centers’ or
‘black jails’ and subject to abuses.”); see also Richard L. Cassin, Whistleblowers in
India Risk Being Murdered, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:28 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/10/20/whistleblowers-in-india-risk-beingmurdered.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that whistleblowers who tried
to expose government corruption have been murdered) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard L. Cassin, Middle East Rulers Wage
War On Whistleblowers, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 14, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/10/14/middle-east-rulers-wage-war-onwhistleblowers.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that whistleblowers are
being jailed and murdered in Oman, Iraq, and Jordan for reporting corruption)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
302. See Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on
the Protection of Whistleblowers, COUNCIL EUR. (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec(2014)7&Language=lanEnglish&Sit
e=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorL
ogged=F5D383 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (recommending that Member States
have a normative, institutional and judicial framework to protect individuals
who, in the context of their work-based relationship, report or disclose
information on threats or harm to the public interest) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal
Protections for Whistleblowers in the EU, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/whistleblowing_in_europe_legal_pro
tections_for_whistleblowers_in_the_eu (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that
the Council action followed a Transparency International report in November
2013 that only four of the Member States offered strong protection to
whistleblowers from employer retaliation) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
303. See generally Commission Regulation 596/2014 of Apr. 16, 2014 On
Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of
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especially in the context of competition law, whistleblowers who
provide information about cartels in which they were involved may
be treated as key witnesses and avoid some penalties.304
Partially in response to the 2014 “LuxLeaks” scandal and the
2016 revelations in the Panama Papers, the European Parliament
in 2017 voted to require the European Commission to institute
stronger protections, albeit without an incentive system, in the EU
whistleblowing program.305 Several EU countries have or have
considered anticorruption laws with whistleblower provisions. For
example, France passed an anticorruption law in November 2016
that included whistleblowing procedures and some protections
against retaliation, but no financial incentives.306 In fact, the
French approach made it clear that the whistleblower should act
without any self-interest.307
Of non-U.S. anticorruption measures, perhaps the best known
is the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act.308 Enacted in 2010, the
Bribery Act is even more stringent than the FCPA in its
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives
2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173/1), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0596 (detailing the
procedures for reporting infringements and financial incentives to
whistleblowers).
304. See Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, supra note 289, at 28 (“In lieu of
monetary incentives, a different form of carrot is made use of in practice within
the EU: Especially in the field of antitrust regulation.”).
305. See Paige Long, Financial Sector Tweaks Made to EU Whistleblower
Measures, LAW360 (July 20, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
946195/financial-sector-tweaks-made-to-eu-whistleblower-measures (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that the European Parliament published a report on
suggested amendments to its whistleblowing proposals) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
306. See Xavier Oustalniol, First Look at the Whistleblower Provisions in the
New French Anti-Corruption Law, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016, 8:18 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/11/21/xavier-oustalniol-first-look-at-thewhistleblower-provisions.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that companies
are now required to implement measures to prevent and detect corruption in
France of foreign countries or influence peddling) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
307. See id. (noting that under the French system, there are no financial
incentives and a whistleblower should act without self-interest, which is contrary
to the U.S. system).
308. 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
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prohibition of foreign bribery.309 The United Kingdom considered
implementing financial incentives for whistleblowers in July 2014,
but decided against them.310 In a joint report, the UK Financial
Conduct Authority and the Bank of England Prudential
Regulation Authority noted that they had reviewed the possibility
of providing financial incentives, and had visited several U.S.
regulatory agencies, including the SEC, that administer such
programs.311 The UK regulators concluded that introducing
financial incentives would be unlikely to increase the number or
quality of the disclosures that they receive from whistleblowers.312
The UK report argued that whistleblower incentives benefit a
small number of persons and do not lead to an increase in the
number or quality of disclosures.313 Instead, whistleblower
incentives were characterized as a complex, costly governance
structure that trigger significant legal fees and could undermine
the introduction and maintenance by firms of their own internal
whistleblower mechanisms.314 In fact, the report listed a number
of moral and other problems that might result from the imposition
of an incentive system, including malicious reporting, entrapment,
conflicts of interest in court, inconsistency of regulators’
expectations of firms, the difficulty of agreeing on whistleblower
qualification criteria, and negative public perceptions.315
Of particular interest for purposes of this Article was the UK
assessment and description of the Dodd–Frank program. The
“Analysis of the US position” noted that, because U.S. awards can
be made only when information from a whistleblower leads directly
to a successful regulatory or criminal case and appropriate funds
are recovered, few whistleblowers are eligible to be considered for
309.
310.

Id. § 6.
See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. & BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTH.,
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS 1 (2014) (stating that strong
measures are needed to encourage and protect whistleblowers, “who can play an
important role in helping to protect the safety and soundness of firms and to
prevent and detect wrongdoing”).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 2 (listing the report’s key findings on whistleblower incentives).
315. Id. at 3.
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awards.316 In addition, the UK regulators blamed the U.S.
statutory confidentiality requirement for preventing U.S.
regulators from warning firms against retaliation against
whistleblowers.317 Overall, the UK regulators concluded that none
of the U.S. agencies that used rewards had seen a significant
increase in either the number or the quality of reports from
whistleblowers.318 The UK report concluded: “There is no empirical
evidence to suggest that the U.S. system raises either the number
or the quality of whistleblower disclosures within the financial
services. Nor do the incentives in the U.S. model appear to improve
the protection available to whistleblowers.”319 Rather than create
a bounty system, the UK regulators proposed to press ahead with
regulatory changes necessary to require firms to have effective
whistleblowing procedures, and to make senior management
accountable for delivering those procedures.320
VI. Conclusion: Does it Work?
A. Do the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Incentives Increase the
Quality or Quantity of Tips?
The UK report conflicts with reports made by the SEC’s Office
of the Whistleblower and the SEC’s Office of Inspector General
regarding the impact of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program.
The SEC Office of Inspector General (OIG), released its Evaluation
of the SEC’s Whistleblower Program in January 2013.321 The OIG
316. See id. at 4 (citing “no more than a handful [of awards granted] since
Dodd–Frank came into force in July 2010”).
317. See id. (determining that under this course of action, there is no
additional protection for whistleblowers).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 7.
320. See id. (“We consider that providing financial incentives to
whistleblowers will not encourage whistleblowing or significantly increase
integrity and transparency in financial markets.”).
321. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, Rep. No.
511, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2013) [hereinafter
SEC, EVALUATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM] (evaluating the whistleblower
program and offering recommendations for improvement of the program).

1160

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (2018)

evaluation concluded that the SEC implementation of the final
rules made the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program at the SEC
“clearly defined and user friendly for users that have basic
securities law, rules, and regulations knowledge.”322 The OIG
report praised the promotion of the program on the SEC website,
the Office of the Whistleblower’s outreach efforts and response
time, and determined that the award levels under the program are
appropriate.323
In the SEC’s 2017 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd–
Frank Whistleblower Program, Office of the Whistleblower Chief
Jane Norberg reported that “the demonstrable benefits of the
program continue to materialize.”324 Chief Norberg noted that
during fiscal year 2017 the Office of the Whistleblower paid twelve
whistleblowers nearly $50 million, including three of the ten
highest awards that had been paid to date.325 The SEC went on to
assert that the program has had a “transformative” effect on the
agency’s enforcement program, and emphasized the hundreds of
millions of dollars that have been returned to investors as a
result.326
In a July 2014 talk at a corporate governance conference,
then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that tips from the program
“have helped the Enforcement Division identify more possible
fraud and other violations and earlier than would otherwise have
322. Id. at v. Several scholars have questioned how much knowledge an
individual must have to realize that a securities law violation, particularly an
FCPA violation, is taking place. Is this basic common sense, or is the FCPA
particularly complex and so unlikely to trigger effective tips? See Dave Ebersole,
Blowing the Whistle on Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Reform, 6 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123 (2011) (analyzing the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
provisions and providing recommendations for the future).
323. See SEC, EVALUATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 321, at v
(“Based on our review of past experience of other whistleblower programs and
practical concerns in the administration of the program, we determine the SEC’s
award levels are reasonable and should not change at this time.”). The report also
rejected the possibility of adding a qui tam provision similar to the one in place
under the False Claims Act. Id.
324. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (“Whistleblower
information has aided the SEC’s efforts to uncover and stop fraudulent
investment schemes.”).
325. Id. at 10.
326. Id.
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been possible.”327 In the 2017 Annual Report to Congress, the SEC
asserted, “[w]histleblowers have provided tremendous value to the
SEC’s enforcement efforts and significant help to investors,” citing
the “hundreds of millions of dollars returned to investors as a
result of actionable information that whistleblower brought to the
agency.”328
This may be particularly true in the context of the FCPA. At
an October 2016 securities law conference, then-SEC FCPA Unit
Chief Kara Brockmeyer cited whistleblower tips and international
cooperation as the primary sources of FCPA cases and credited
both with the record FCPA enforcement of 2016.329
The Dodd–Frank whistleblower program is growing. The
number of whistleblower tips under the program has risen every
year since its establishment.330 The Office of the Whistleblower
received over 4,400 tips in fiscal year 2017, nearly a 50% increase
from the program’s first full year in 2012.331 In addition, during
fiscal year 2017, the SEC returned nearly 3,200 phone calls from
members of the public.332 Perhaps even more significantly, there is
a ready supply of attorneys who specialize in representing
327. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Few Things
Directors Should Know About the SEC, Address at Stanford University Rock
Center for Corporate Governance Twentieth Annual Stanford Directors’ College
(June 23, 2014); see also LABATON SUCHAROW, ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND
CHANGE: THE SEC WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM YEAR IN REVIEW 3 (2014),
http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/upload/Achievements-Challenges-andChange-SEC-Whistleblower-Program-YIR.pdf (quoting Mary Jo White’s
address).
328. SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
329. See FCPA Chief Touts Record High Enforcement Actions—Links
Avoiding a Monitor to Early Remediation of FCPA Issues, BAKER HOSTETLER (Oct.
17,
2016),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/fcpa-chief-touts-record-highenforcement-actions-links-avoiding-a-monitor-to-early-remediation-of-fcpa-issues
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (summarizing Brockmeyer’s remarks during the
annual Securities Docket Conference on October 13, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
330. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (showing that the
SEC received 224 tips in (partial year) 2011, 3,001 in 2012, 3,238 in 2013, 3,620
in 2014, 3,923 in 2015, 4,218 in 2016, and 4484 in 2017).
331. See id. (citing the increasing number of tips as evidence that awareness
of the whistleblower program has grown significantly over the years).
332. See id. at 8 (stating that many of those phone calls related to the proper
procedure for submitting tips).
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whistleblowers, and shepherding them through the SEC process.
Over half of the award recipients were represented by counsel
when they initially submitted their tips, and others retained
counsel either during the subsequent investigation or the award
process.333
The SEC is clear that the payment of awards incentivizes
persons to come forward and provide information,334 and that it
positively impacts SEC enforcement of the federal securities
laws.335
As mentioned above, in fiscal year 2017 the SEC also made
twelve awards, bringing the annual total to nearly $50 million.336
By the end of the fiscal year, the SEC had awarded a total of
approximately $160 million to forty-six whistleblowers in the
history of the program.337
The tips received by the Office of the Whistleblower in fiscal
year 2017 most often detailed violations of rules relating to
corporate disclosures and financial statements (19%), fraud in
connection with public offerings (18%), and market manipulation
(12%).338 However, alleged FCPA violations also account for a
significant number of the tips each year.339 Of the 4,218 tips
received in 2016, 238 or 5.6% were FCPA-related.340 Of the 4,484
333. See id. at 18 (“Whistleblowers seeking an award are not required to be
represented by counsel unless they choose to file their tips with the Commission
anonymously.”).
334. Id. at 3.
335. See id. (“We are proud that the whistleblower program continues to
positively impact the SEC’s enforcement of the federal securities laws. We are
confident that it will continue to bolster the agency’s mission of protection of
investors and the markets in the years ahead.”).
336. Id. at 1.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 24 (providing a chart of the most common complaint categories
reported by whistleblowers).
339. It is worth noting that many of the law firms that specialize in
whistleblower law have specific information on their website relating to the FCPA
and explaining that FCPA tips could earn a bounty under the Dodd–Frank
program. See, e.g., Foreign Bribery Whistleblowers, KATZ, MARSHALL & BANKS
LLP, http://www.kmblegal.com/resources/foreign-bribery-whistleblowers (last
visited Jan. 11, 2018) (describing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
340. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
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tips received in 2017, 210 or 4.7% were FCPA-related.341 As
discussed above in Part II.B.1, although the SEC’s strictly enforced
confidentiality requirements make it impossible to confirm
whether any of the awards corresponded to an FCPA case, press
reports indicated that at least one of the SEC’s 2016 awards went
to a BHP Billiton employee reporting an FCPA violation.342
B. Do the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Incentives Improve
Enforcement of the FCPA?
The Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system has the
potential to increase effective enforcement of the FCPA by
encouraging whistleblowers to report FCPA violations to the
SEC.343 2017 was the second-strongest year on record for
enforcement of the FCPA, as measured by the size and volume of
recoveries. If more enforcement triggers more compliance, then one
might think that the Dodd–Frank incentive program will lead to
more compliance. Fear of SEC investigations and enforcement of
possible securities law violations, fueled by whistleblowers seeking
big financial rewards, may make companies increase their
vigilance against violations of the FCPA.
Although the incentive award program is relatively small, it
has been well publicized. The publicity itself may be useful.
Arguably, the program does not need to pay many awards to have
an effect on compliance and decrease corruption. As then-Chief
McKessy pointed out in 2012, even one large FCPA-related
whistleblower award, if the whistleblower announces it publicly,
may attract broad public attention and an influx of new tips.344 The
DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 23 (2016) (providing a chart of the
most common complaint categories reported by whistleblowers in 2016).
341. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 24 (providing a chart of
the most common complaint categories reported by whistleblowers in 2017).
342. Supra Part II.B.1.
343. But see ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER 14
(2012) (showing that monetary incentives are the least likely of the methods being
examined to motivate reporting outside the company).
344. See Daniel B. Pickard et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 2013
Year-in-Review, 31 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 377 (2014) (“FCPA violations [are]
increasingly fertile ground for the agency’s whistleblowing program, potentially
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mere possibility of bounty-hungry whistleblowers may be a strong
deterrent to corporations contemplating bribery.345
Yet compliance may increase only marginally. SEC and DOJ
enforcement of the FCPA has been very high for almost a decade,
and many companies subject to the law have already made
substantial and costly upgrades to their internal compliance
programs.346 It is possible that some companies cannot do much
more. Even the threat of more whistleblowers may not produce
significantly more effective compliance programs if companies are
already doing what they can.347
Moreover, if the Dodd–Frank program has the effect of
drawing whistleblowers away from internal reporting channels,
there is a risk that it may decrease internal reporting, which may
be suboptimal. Whistleblowers prefer to report internally first.348
Internal reporting gives companies a chance to remedy a problem,

increasing the importance of self-disclosure of potential violations by
corporations.”).
345. See id. (“[C]ases against individuals have a great deterrent value as they
drive home to individuals the real consequences to them personally that their acts
can have.”).
346. See id. (stating that “it is more important than ever for companies to
implement well-tailored anticorruption compliance programs, including
appropriate due diligence on joint venture partners, international agents and
other third parties”). Much of this with the help of their attorneys. The resulting
FCPA compliance industry has been dubbed “FCPA Inc.” by Professor Mike
Koehler in his writings and on his FCPA Professor site. See Mike Koehler, A
Common Language to Remedy Distorted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement Statistics, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 553, 554 (2016) (“At present,
however, the FCPA’s conversational waters are muddied because this niche
practice area (often referred to as FCPA Inc.) lacks a lingua franca, or common
language.”).
347. For example, in response to the allegations of bribery by its Mexican
subsidiary, Wal-Mart instituted an extensive new compliance program, which, by
the end of 2016, was estimated to have cost $263 million, in addition to the $557
million investigation it conducted. See Matt Kelly, Walmart FCPA Costs: $820
Million
and
Counting,
RADICAL
COMPLIANCE
(Dec.
4,
2016),
http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2016/12/04/walmart-fcpa-costs-820-millioncounting/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting Wal-Mart’s FCPA costs) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
348. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 343, at 2, 11 (noting that only 2% of
employees solely go outside the company and never report the wrongdoing they
have observed to their employer).
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stopping the FCPA violations right away.349 And internal reporting
does not raise the vexing conflicts of duties that force the employee
to choose between loyalty to the employer and civic obligation.350
SEC statistics, however, suggest that this is not the case, and
the incentive program is functioning to backstop internal reporting
systems that have failed. The SEC reports that by the end of fiscal
year 2017, approximately 62% of whistleblower award recipients
were insiders in the company with respect to which they reported
information of wrongdoing.351 Furthermore, “[o]f the award
recipients who were current or former employees of the entity,
approximately 83% raised their concerns internally to their
supervisors or compliance personnel, or understood that their
supervisor or relevant compliance personnel knew of the
violations, before reporting their information of wrongdoing to the
Commission.”352
Still, there remain objections to the program. For example, by
imposing the substantial costs of administering the program on the
SEC,353 the incentive system may divert funds that would be better
used for enforcement. Or perhaps the incentive system floods the
SEC with frivolous tips. The SEC is a famously overstretched
agency, as became painfully clear during the Global Financial
Crisis and the Madoff scandal.354
Each year there are huge discrepancies between the number
of tips reported, the number of enforcement judgments,355 and
349. See id. at 17 (stating that employees internally report to get a more
complete picture of the situation and allow the company an opportunity to address
the issue).
350. See id. at 11 (providing that most employees choose to report internally
based on loyalty and personal relationships with supervisors).
351. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (clarifying that
despite the fact that a majority of whistleblowers are company insiders, there is
no requirement that an individual be an employee or company insider to be
eligible for an award).
352. Id.
353. See id. at 6 (stating that in addition to the Chief and Deputy Chief, the
Office of the Whistleblower was staffed with eleven attorneys, four paralegals,
and an administrative assistant).
354. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 12 (providing that the SEC failed to
uncover the Madoff Ponzi scheme for more than twenty years after investors lost
$65 million).
355. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 301–02 (“[S]ome scholars have argued that,
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number of awards made. No doubt many such tips are without
merit, and perhaps others are resolved through negotiation. As of
the end of fiscal year 2017, the SEC had received over 22,000 tips
but made only forty-six awards based on thirty-seven actions.356
The low number of tips that lead to awards suggests that the SEC
simply cannot act on all of the tips it receives.357 And once it decides
to act, litigation is often slow and expensive, not to mention
uncertain.
It is thus conceivable that the Dodd–Frank program could
have a suboptimal effect on FCPA compliance. Rather than
attempt to instill a culture of cooperation and voluntary
compliance, Dodd–Frank may have instituted an expensive policy
of (occasionally well-paid) internal surveillance.
C. Conclusion
As matter of comparative law and social science, however, it is
difficult to prove that a more cooperative regime would be more
effective. And, based on history and experience, we know that SOX
did not prevent the levels of fraud and noncompliance that
contributed to if not caused the Global Financial Crisis. SOX relied
largely on internal review structures and assessments and SOX
evidently failed, or at least the nation endured a great number of
violations.358 So it is unsurprising that over the years Congress has
moved from simple prohibitions on fraud to requiring compliance
programs to offering an incentive system for information. There
by failing to institute a qui tam system or to impose any costs on the
whistleblower, the Act fails to provide an adequate screening mechanism to
discourage frivolous tips.”).
356. See generally SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 16, 23. See
also Baer, supra note 10, at 2217 (citing a similarly low number of awards at the
end of 2016 and suggesting that the low “hit rate” of 0.2% results from the fact
that the strongest tips would come from complicit tipsters, who hesitate to blow
the whistle because of the risk of self-incrimination).
357. See id. at 2218 (suggesting that the SEC may have too much discretion
in deciding how to handle tips and complaints).
358. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 292–93 (“Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
initially appeared to offer whistleblowers an easy path to recover damages,
empirical evidence suggests that the path was a particularly steep one.”).
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seems to be a growing consensus, at least in the United States, that
a strong whistleblower system includes meaningful rewards for
the whistleblowers.359
There are also ways to improve or at least increase the scope
of the incentive award system. Several authors have argued for the
imposition of a qui tam provision, which would spare
administrative resources and deputize whistleblowers in a manner
similar to the FCA.360 Similarly, the SEC could relax the
$1,000,000 threshold for an eligible action.361 The number seems
somewhat random, and prevents whistleblowers in smaller
instances from coming forward.
Regardless of whether the Dodd–Frank system of
whistleblower compensation is optimal, however, for the
foreseeable future it is reasonable to assume that the program will
pay awards to whistleblowers who report FCPA violations. As long
as the FCPA is vigorously enforced and illicit payments to foreign
officials remain a prominent feature of international business,
whistleblower incentives will remain attractive to regulators.
Thus, for purposes of FCPA enforcement, bounties for
whistleblowers are here to stay.

359. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 5 (“Incentives to whistleblowers have been
increased dramatically as a result of Dodd–Frank and the changes to the Internal
Revenue Code in December 2006 mandating whistleblower rewards.”).
360. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The
Screening Value of Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2014) (theorizing
that a whistleblowing program’s ease of entry can swamp an agency with low
value information, thereby undermining enforcement, while a qui tam action acts
as a screening tool for complaints).
361. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 302 (“This [million dollar] restriction
deviates from the recovery available to whistleblowers under FCA, as under the
FCA, whistleblowers may recover their share of the bounty regardless of how
much the government recovers.”).

